Understanding
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Aditya Dwarkesh
R. N. Podar Institute, Jain Derasar Marg, Mumbai.
aditya.dwarkesh@gmail.com

Abstract

The significance of paradox in humanity's quest for the truth cannot be exaggerated; here is a notion which nearly single-handedly guides all the intellectual pursuits of man.
Now, we typically understand by paradox something which lies beyond our understanding, but our understanding of the word 'understanding' itself, to which we have shifted the burden of meaning, is rather poor.
In the following article, I attempt to contextualize insights on the word 'paradox' via certain studies in the backdrop of our everyday understanding of the word. I begin from the standpoint of a common man using the word in ordinary parlance, and attempt to trace out organically the deeper conclusions regarding the nature of what it connotes. This is done with an interdisciplinary approach, using tools including but not limited to epistemic cues from the physical sciences.
It is my hope that, with the conclusions obtained by this analysis, we may know better what it means to understand anything.

1 Introduction

1.1 A cosmic terror

The paradox has, for very long, been seen as the villain of knowledge, making the intellectuals of mankind work perennially to banish it, and yet somehow always finding a way back in to haunt our systems of the world.

Perhaps the grandest example of the same is Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead's towering three-volume *Principia Mathematica*, an endeavour which no doubt demanded great courage and tremendous vision from both the authors (indeed, a fourth volume on geometry had been planned but never came to fruition due to the intellectual exhaustion both authors suffered from once these three volumes had been completed), for it was a true behemoth of an attempt to once and for all close mankind's fortress of knowledge from the slippery snake that was the paradox.

We all now know of the unfortunate (certainly very much so for the authors) manner in which that story concluded. In 1931, not too many years after the publication of Principia Mathematica, Kurt Gödel published his two destructive incompleteness theorems, proving that systems with sufficient representative power could never be simultaneously complete and consistent. [1]

As profound as the theorem is, along with its implications on our subject matter, I bring up these events presently in a different context. They are representative of the way in which we treat the notion of paradox.

Of course, our repulsion towards it is only natural. In common parlance, the word is taken as synonymous with a complete lack of understanding regarding something; and what kind of a theory is one which says only that the object of its concern is something that we have no understanding of?

Bracketing our dispositions towards the paradox under a monochrome of aversion is an unjustifiable generalization, however. We have undeniably always felt a romantic pull of sorts exerted upon us by it, a sense of beauty accompanying certain incomprehensible statements, exemplified by majestic declarations of the Universe residing within the self. And on this matter, I shall say no more, but allow Socrates to conclude with the following thought-provoking assertion of his: that we love and find beauty in that which we do not have. [2]

Our love-hate relationship towards the whole affair is an expression of a much deeper dichotomy that is a part of the human condition and lies within the self, one that has so far proven impervious and impenetrable towards rational analysis due to its very nature. It is that ageless valley between science and art, logic and emotion; the two elements Friedrich Nietzsche referred to as the Apollonian and the Dionysian, Apollo relentless in his quest to banish the paradox, Dionysus lovingly embracing it. [3]

1.2 Setting the stage

The remarkable ability of philosophy to examine its own self must be seen as simultaneously a gift and a duty. And so, we may use this self-awareness of it, nay, we must use this self-awareness of it to build our arguments in a manner not unlike Neurath's famed boat[4]; rebuilding it even as we stand upon it, using its own support to modify it.

We wish to explicitly mark the trail leading up to and simultaneously uncover the epistemological and ontological associations of the word 'paradox'. Let us begin, then, from a

[1] Kurt Gödel (1958). "Über eine bisher noch nicht benüzte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes." Dialectica v. 12, pp. 280–287. Reprinted in English translation in Gödel's Collected Works, vol II, Soloman Feferman et al., eds. Oxford University Press, 1990.

[2] Plato, Phaedrus, trans. by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. From Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper.

[3] Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth of Tragedy (Trans. Douglas Smith), Oxford University Press, 2008

[4] Neurath, Otto (1921). Anti-Spengler. Vienna Circle Collection vol. 1: Empiricism and Sociology (1973)

most natural explanation of the word which comes to us via our intuition and fix this as a transient and operational definition/meaning for the same, without paying too much heed, for the time being, to austerity and formality:

When we are logically unable to comprehend the occurrence of a certain state of affairs, we call it paradoxical.

This ought to be an agreeable starting point for all. However, we must not fool ourselves into believing that we have made any real progress over here. In making this gross approximation, we are only throwing the burden of the word 'paradox' onto other words such as 'logically', 'comprehend', and so on. But we shall stick with it for now as a starting point, and allow it to evolve and clarify itself organically in the course of the following discussion.

The common-sense notion of a word and the more austere notion held by the experts on the matter may differ, but let us not use this to belittle the common-sense notion and undermine its importance, for it is also capable of telling us a lot about the nature of the word. Having said this, let us look into the above rephrasing a bit further.

When the phrase 'state of affairs' is used, one (typically) refers to something empirical in nature. But it has often been held that it is problematic to speak of, say, a theorem in mathematics as directly representing an empirical state of affairs due to its very abstract nature. Whether or not mathematics ultimately has empirical groundings is another issue altogether; my point here is that it does not, at least, seem to be an empirical science.

And this implies that my initial 'definition' does not consider paradoxes of mathematics altogether, and is concerned only with paradoxes occurring in 'natural language' (whatever that may be). I would argue, however, that taking paradoxes of natural language as our starting point in this manner would be the more appropriate chronology for treatment due to the simple reason that this is the chronology in which they occurred in mankind's theories and visions of the world. We tried to imagine a ball being simultaneously red and blue before we spoke of contradictions in mathematical proofs. [5]

I must reemphasize on the importance of my using the phrase 'seem to be'. The fact that we feel paradoxes involving balls which are simultaneously of two distinct colours are, in a sense, fundamentally empirical and thus distinct in nature from the non-empirical mathematical contradiction, may be illusory. However, the illusion itself is still very much real and unignorable! [6]

[5] In other words, I find myself dissatisfied by beginning analysis by attempting to first cement the word by postulating and fixing a 'rigorous' definition for it. We must begin by allowing the entity to wag its tail freely, so to speak, and observe the patterns it makes, and only then will we find ourselves able to 'cement' it in some way.

[6] We shall see later that this illusion paves the path for us to coherently assign a 'value' of sorts to the 'intensity' of a paradox.

2 Paradox and Theory

2.1 Empiricism

Here are two wildly popular examples of 'impossible figures', complementing the initial 'definition' for the word put forward:


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It must be evident to the viewer in little time that such figures can never exist in our empirical world due to certain properties they possess. However, despite their impossibility, the creators of these figures have somehow conveyed to us precisely what they are. They are truly paradoxical, yes, and yet, we have understood them in some strange yet important sense.

(One may even claim Euclidean geometry to be a very good example of this, for a true two-dimensional line can never exist in our empirical world, and should in every sense be as paradoxical as Penrose's triangle, and yet we are able to conduct extensive discussions on the same.)

[7] "The Penrose triangle... is a triangular impossible object, an optical illusion consisting of an object which can be depicted in a perspective drawing, but cannot exist as a solid object." Source: Wikipedia

[8] "Waterfall... shows a perpetual motion machine where water from the base of a waterfall appears to run downhill along the water path before reaching the top of the waterfall. The watercourse supplying the waterfall has the structure of two Penrose triangles." Source: Wikipedia

Let us try and find out how we are able to attain this unexpected transcendence of language which allows us to comprehend some fact about the incomprehensible.

But first, let us acknowledge the fact that this peculiar access to the inaccessible has certain important implications regarding the kind of theories we are able to construct about the world as a whole. This tells us that if the world were made up of Penrose triangles, it would still be a fact we can convey and understand the material implications of, in spite of our blatant inability to truly comprehend and visualize one.

And this is no mere speculation, for as it turns out, our best physical theory of the universe does, in fact, tell us that the world is made up of something which seems to be as strange and inexplicable as a Penrose triangle: I refer here to quantum mechanics. Despite being famously counterintuitive, the system has forced itself upon the scientific community via one imposing experimental result after the other, and has been accepted more or less unanimously by the same.

I shall not get into the specific details of why quantum mechanics appears so very strange. An extremely non-technical, cursory overview one of its most striking peculiarities (the only one, maybe?) is what I must present:

The central and perhaps most enigmatic object in quantum theory is the *quantum superposition*. It has been treated by many as the root of all the befuddlement that follows.

And it turns out that what one means when one says that a certain electron, which is travelling from one place to another via a path A or a path B, is in a superposition state of taking the two paths, is that the electron is not travelling via path A, and neither is it travelling through path B, and neither is it somehow travelling through both paths A and B simultaneously, and finally-and this truly is the fatal blow-that it is not even somehow teleporting from one place to the other and taking neither path A nor path B.

In other words, we are forced to eliminate all the four *Boolean*, logical possibilities as having occurred! Our most reliable experiments are giving us utterly incomprehensible data sets.

But the results are what they are; the scientist is forced to accept this, trudge onward and quantify the results to the best of his abilities.

We see with this illustration that empirical findings can guide us into extrapolating conclusions which in turn can in principle never be observed/visualized directly by us. The ability of the empirical world to propel us into modelling that which transcends it has allowed us to embed paradox at the heart of our best physical theories of the universe.

And while it may be the one with the strongest empirical groundings, quantum mechanics is not even the first theory of the world which embraces contradiction; the history of philosophy, which is where the natural sciences find their roots, has seen many worldviews

of the romantic kind which are even more blatantly and proudly inconsistent. [9]

Now, it has been suggested that quantum mechanics can be grounded on the concept of an *epistemic horizon* as a foundational principle. The crux of the suggestion is that if we committed ontologically to a law which states that one can only know a certain maximum amount of information regarding a system at a given point, we find that the system automatically emulates behaviour which is tantalizingly similar to that of quantum mechanical systems. [10]

We seem to have a clearer hint, then, towards the fact that the presence of a paradox is also representative of a lack of *information* or *knowledge*. Perhaps if we added some lines to the Penrose triangle, thus adding some information to it, it would cease to be paradoxical. Even the most elementary paradox of all— "x and $not - x$" —can be made to vanish by an addition of information: if we were to introduce a temporal aspect to the statement, then we could certainly have x be true at a time $\mathrm{T_a}$ and false at a time $\mathrm{T_b}$.

In other words, there are infinitely many arbitrary ways in which one can extend a theory which appears to contain paradoxical assertions such that the paradox vanishes. The choice Kurt Gödel gave us between incompleteness and inconsistency disappears, and we are, from this angle, left with incompleteness alone.

Furthermore, having been nudged by our notions regarding the epistemic inaccessibility of that which is paradoxical, we see that we can now try and define a paradox more a little rigorously as that which is empirically inaccessible to us.

2.2 Contrasting Worldviews

We have so far identified relationships between the paradox, empirical inaccessibility and information deficiency.

These notions are further related to assertions of our in-principle inability to dispel all of our ignorance-an assertion which is a hard pill to swallow, no doubt, as is made evident by the uproar that ran parallel to the development of quantum theory and the dislike some

[9] But wait! What, precisely, do I mean when I say all this about quantum mechanics? Classical quantum mechanics has been axiomatized into a consistent first order theory and contains no logically contradictory statements. On what basis can I then call it paradoxical? On the basis that, while we can offer mathematically rigorous explications of all its phenomena, we cannot still honestly claim to have understood (whatever 'understanding' may be) and visualized what it means to be in a superposition state in the same way we understand what it means for a ball to be in a fixed position. And even if it so turns out that I got it all completely wrong about quantum mechanics due to lack of expertise, my point regarding the possibility of this class of theories stands.

[10] The kind of epistemic horizon I speak of here is not, by the way, the same kind of epistemic horizon hidden variable theories speak of. Hidden variable theories say that the position and momentum have well-defined values in the empirical world which we can never know; this epistemic horizon as a foundational principle says that position and momentum do not have well-defined values because the empirical world can only admit within it a fixed amount of information. For a more detailed exposition on this, refer to: Szangolies, Jochen. "Epistemic Horizons and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics." Foundations of Physics 48.12 (2018): 1669–1697. Crossref. Web.

of its own founders harboured for it. In fact, many stand fast on the claim that quantum theory cannot possibly be the final theory and interpretation of the way the world works. There is a demand for an alternative. Can they get it?

The American philosopher W.V.O Quine and his demonstration of the impossibility of radical translation enters our discussion. The intuitively palatable conclusion I shall borrow and accept dogmatically from him (although a better and more elaborate justification is present in the source work) is the following: *For a given empirical data set, one can construct arbitrarily many distinct theories capable of explicating all the phenomena contained in it.* [11]

Now, this implies that there necessarily exist other interpretations of the experimental results which led to quantum theory which need not contain such counterintuitive postulates.

Clearly, the *Quinean* positivist can, if he wishes to do so, make the paradox vanish with a snap of his fingers, extending his theory in whatever manner may be required, replacing the inconsistency with an incompleteness. [12]

Why, then, did we construct this theory, and not one of the other logically possible non-counterintuitive ones? The positivist would, perhaps, respond by saying that we did this due to the fact that alternatives to quantum theory would be greatly complex ones; for the sake of eliminating paradox, we would have to forgo a great degree of simplicity; the positivist would say that in this case, the trade-off was just not worth it. [13]

However, simplicity seems to be an awfully anthropocentric notion to base one's theory of the world on. This brings us to the great dichotomy between positivism and realism; for in contrast to this subtle anthropocentrism of the positivists, a realist may hold that objects exist in an 'objective reality', and that it is the task of the philosopher-scientist to investigate them.

Now, this freedom that the positivist has with regards to making the paradox disappear is not offered to the realist, for he begins with the assumption of an 'objective reality' which it is our task to uncover, and this 'objective reality' can well be something which is of the form of a paradox to us; and if the realist finds that that is how things appear to be, he must necessarily commit to the existence of paradoxical phenomena. He is forced to live with this for the sake of the completeness an 'objective reality' entails.

Let us conclude this discussion by observing how a theory of the world may be of two types: The positivist type, maintaining that the empirical world of the entity is all there is

[11] Quine, Willard Van Orman, Word and Object [1960], ch.2. New edition, with a foreword by Patricia Churchland, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015

[12] Quine's assertion of the multiplicity of theories for a singular data set does not in any way enable us to conclude that each of these individual theories must be *complete*. Two given theories can be both internally incomplete and incompatible with each other.

[13] van Quine W.O. (1964) On Simple Theories of a Complex World. In: Gregg J.R., Harris F.T.C. (eds) Form and Strategy in Science. Springer, Dordrecht

and that a paradox simply does not exist, and the realist type, acknowledging the existence of the unknown.

We begin now to see hints of a parallel between physical paradoxes and mathematical contradictions, for at his most extreme, we can imagine the realist committing not only to physical paradoxes but to literal mathematical contradictions: The position of the electron, he may find himself claiming senselessly in order to adhere to some incomprehensible objective reality he feels he has uncovered, is not a null set and is the real solution of the equation $x^2 + 1 = 0$.

With these comments, it is now time to dispel the illusory dichotomy between the two I referred to in the first section.

There is, it seems, inarguably some difference between a mathematical contradiction and a physical paradox. Physical paradoxes are blatant, jumping out at us. Mathematical statements, on the other hand, often require long, non-intuitive proofs in order to prove them to be inconsistent with the rest of the system.

Another point of difference between the two is that, in comparison to our partial understanding of physical paradoxes, we are able to obtain little to no comprehension on mathematical contradictions; we lose almost all sense of what is being spoken about when we are facing statements such as 'x and $not - x$' or '1+1=3'.

These aspects beg us to give the notion of 'paradox' a decidedly different treatment when in a mathematical context.

But a counter-argument rises up. Does it not seem that those which we refer to as 'physical paradoxes' are ultimately reducible to mathematical contradictions? Is it not so that a Penrose triangle, when we get right down to it, is finally an impossible figure because it violates certain mathematical, geometrical rules?

To dispel these problems, we shall invoke the popular 'web of belief' metaphor (attributed to none other than Quine), utilized as a visual method to explain the illusion of analyticity in the very article in which he demonstrated the unreality of the analytic/synthetic distinction. [14]

Before we proceed, a brief review of the distinction and the article is in order.

An analytic statement is typically defined as a sentence whose truth depends only upon the meaning of its constituents. On the other hand, the truth of a synthetic sentence depends upon the way the world is; in other words, it depends upon the facts about the world which it represents.

On this basis, the sentence 'All bachelors are unmarried' seems quite clearly analytic in

[14] van Quine W.O. 1951, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", Philosophical Review, 60: 20–43; reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, pp. 20–46.

nature, and the sentence 'It is raining outside', synthetic.

Not so, argues Quine. Without going into too much detail, Quine's argument against the division is, as Graham Priest described it succinctly (in an article in which he attempts in part to refute Quine's argument, as it so happens)[15], "essentially a two-pronged argument. . . . The prongs are:

1. There is no non-circular definition of the word 'analytic'.

2. Under the pressure of recalcitrant experience there are no beliefs that cannot be held on to, and conversely, no belief that cannot be revised."

I shall accept this conclusion as well without placing it under further scrutiny (although a better and more elaborate justification can be found in the source work).

Let us now witness the effectiveness of the 'web of belief' metaphor in explaining why there exists the illusion of analyticity.

According to this, our beliefs are, as the name suggests, structured in the form of a web. There are statements near the edges which are very prone to revision ('It will rain tomorrow'), and then there are more central sentences, beliefs that lie near the centre of our web, whose susceptibility to revision is extremely low ('I am a human being').

With this groundwork done, we can now claim that we lose all sense of what is being spoken about when confronted with a mathematical contradiction due to the high degree of centrality of mathematical sentences; and we can claim also that physical paradoxes are blatant and 'jump out' at us because, being more surface-level, they require little introspection to verify their impossibility.

And it is indeed true that the problem of a Penrose triangle can, by virtue of some transformations and in conjunction with the geometrical structure of three-dimensional Euclidean space, be reduced to an abstract, mathematical contradiction; but we now see that this, in fact, emboldens the web of belief metaphor, for one of the most important characteristics of a web-like structure, its primary manner of expressing itself, is the various interconnections that exist between its nodes.

We see also that, as the degree of centrality of a given belief increases, our ability to obtain information regarding its negation must decrease; this accounts for the reduction in our ability to comprehend of mathematical contradictions (as opposed to physical paradoxes).

This has given us a nice way to measure the degree of paradoxicality for a given statement, for the above conclusion implies that, for the person who claims that it will rain tomorrow, even the seemingly innocent statement 'It will not rain tomorrow' would be classified as a

[15]Priest, Graham. "Two Dogmas of Quineanism." The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), vol. 29, no. 117, 1979, pp. 289–301. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2219445.

paradox; albeit a benign one, for it allows the aforementioned person access to a considerable amount of information regarding the nature of its assertion.

The perceptive reader may find himself in some slight discomfort at this point. I obstinately call the statement 'It will not rain tomorrow' a paradox in the above example, but is it not true that with the right kind of new information (meteorological data, thunderclouds in the horizon), this statement will cease to be a paradox and become a genuinely comprehended belief held? How can this transition from paradox to belief occur? We shall look into this in the next section.

3 Conclusions

3.1 Inferences

In order to examine this transition from paradox to belief, let us look into our latest definition of the word, arrived at at the end of section 2.1: *With respect to a given animate entity*[16]*, an object which lies outside the empirical world of that entity is, for it, a 'paradox'.*

We must now scrutinize this newest phrase upon which we have put the burden of meaning: What does it mean to be empirically inaccessible? What is it that makes some things empirically inaccessible (and others accessible)? And how is it that we may know certain facts about them?

Let us begin answering these questions with a rather basic query: Is the empirical world of a blind man the same as that of ours?

How could we know what it is like to be a blind man, when we often find ourselves unable to empathize with and know what it is like to be even a close friend undergoing some difficult time in his life? Of course, the ready rebuttal to this argument is the following: That I may not, as of now, be able to know precisely what this close friend of mine is going through, but this is only a practical shortcoming, not an in-principle one, and I certainly will if (God forbid!) I end up having the same crisis in my life.

But to say this is to say nothing at all! Certainly, I will know what it is like to be a blind man if I myself go blind; certainly, I will know what it is like to be a bat if I myself become a bat. The only difference is that we are more likely to become a blind man than we are to become a bat.[17]

With these words, I have *almost* locked myself up into a private empirical world of my own. Almost, but not quite; for the elaboration made here is not quite the same as to say the trivially true statement that two distinct people exist in two distinct worlds merely by virtue of being two distinct people. It *is* possible for two people to share all beliefs and have, in essence, identical webs of belief, implying identical source empirical worlds. Quine's indeterminacy does not tell us that two people cannot have identical epistemic worlds; it

[16] Whatever that may be.

[17] And, we shall see, this idea of likelihood stems from some notion of 'distance' between two worlds.

tells us that, if they do, they can never know this. Now, is this evolutionarily determined?

Partially, at the very least, I would suggest. For clearly, if the empirical world of a blind man cannot be the same as ours, that of an amoeba is most certainly not the same as ours; and of course, consequently, that which lies in their 'inaccessibility region' is not the same as that which lies in ours.

But this also carries with it the underlying suggestion that evolution is driving towards a fixed 'goal' (to increase the boundaries of the empirical world of an organism), and this is a suggestion we would want to get rid of. So perhaps we may say that the empirical world of the amoeba is not the same as ours, but also that it is not a *subset* of ours, and that it may have access to empirical knowledge and data that we do not.

And as our inner workings become more and more distinct from that of an amoeba, our access to that which is in its empirical world becomes more and more distant, giving rise to this partial-knowledge phenomenon.

Clearly, in this sort of conceptual scheme, we can speak of physical facts which are empirically inaccessible to us, and can include the same in our theory in a vicarious manner, for although they may be inaccessible to us, the very same could quite plausibly accessible to the amoeba and represent coherent physical facts for it. The essential suggestion here is that each organism has its own distinct and bounded empirical world; there is a very large overlap, degree of closeness, between the empirical world of two humans, and a small—but nonzero—overlap between that of a human and an amoeba. What lies beyond these bounds for a given organism is for it paradoxical, inaccessible, transcendental.[18]

We are now in a position to dispel all discomfort regarding my assertion of the statement 'It will not rain tomorrow' being paradoxical, and my conclusions of each empirical world being its owner's private domain inaccessible to others.

Access to fresh meteorological data has enabled the man's web of belief to metamorphosize into a different structure with different nodes. He has, in effect, been thrown into an entirely different and new empirical world. And thus, that which was previously paradoxical to him is now not so.

We may yet call that paradox a benign one, however, for the new empirical world which he finds himself in is very closely related to his previous one; and so that which is non-paradoxical in the new one may be only very benignly paradoxical in the old one. And as

[18]Since the idea of suggesting bounded empirical worlds can be sourced (here) from the possibility of an epistemic horizon in quantum mechanics, we can also note how, much like how we have observed a certain degree of incompatibility of the epistemic world of the amoeba and the epistemic world of the human, we have in quantum mechanics a similar kind of degree of incompatibility between certain observables (most famously position and momentum). It also follows that the sense in speaking of the set of all possible epistemic worlds is analogous to that of speaking of the set of all possible observables, and we may also now touch upon an idea that no doubt every reader would have played with at some point of time. If we take a paradox as an unutterable, what about those objects which are not even speakable of as unspeakable? These objects, then, would perhaps be outside the set of all empirical worlds.

the distance between two worlds increases, a belief in one may convert into an increasingly vicious paradox in the other.

3.2 Final remarks

We have finally arrived at a perspective of the word 'understanding' which exhibits all the aspects of this word to their glorious fullest extents, one which does not attempt to reduce it to mechanistic neural networks (but does not, in fact, contradict the mechanistic theories of neural network; one which may be said to be *incompatible* with them) and thus retains the element of true magic that one indubitably experiences upon being able to understand something new.

To understand something is to have access to hitherto inaccessible and unknown empirical data; understanding signifies the existential shift of a being from one epistemic world to another. And to understand is not only to know what it is like to be something, it is to *become* that very something, relinquishing also in this single transcendental act the knowledge of what it was like to be something else. Upon understanding, something new is gained, but something old is equally lost.

But there is reason for discomfort here as well. I speak of relationships between worlds; I have also referred previously to the 'distance' between two worlds (a gap of understanding). But with what metric do I speak of this quantity? How may we hinge ourselves onto an objective point of view and speak of relationships between worlds? Are we in this matter, too, as all others, confined to our own private world, unable to make any decisive judgement?

Impossible. Let us not let ourselves fall into the snares of solipsism! We know that there is something it is like to be *me*, and as I traverse across worlds, I realize that there is also something it is like to be someone else, and so there must also exist, beyond all doubt, a *someone-else*.

And so now, at long last, after suffering through the many mountains and valleys of indeterminacies and uncertainties and imprisonment in private worlds, we catch glimpses of, feel hints of, an ultimate field unifying us all underneath all this worldly turbulence, drawing us together inexorably with its transcendental strings, bringing us all down to it.

> *"Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that origin [of silence], so long as we fail to find, beneath the chatter of words, the primordial silence."*[19]

[19]Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961. Phenomenology Of Perception. London : New York :Routledge K. Paul; Humanities Press, 1974.