

Quine:

An analytic statement is one which is true by virtue of meaning rather than fact. What is meaning? It is equivalent to neither naming nor extension. After separating it from reference, we see that meaning simply helps in the business of synonymy, and can be abandoned "as obscure intermediary entities". It is then shown that attempting to derive analyticity from cognitive synonymy leads to an inescapable circularity. He further shows that one cannot force a set of analytical statements upon an artificial language unless the notion of analyticity is somehow understood beforehand, thus undermining that possibility.

The argument on reductionism does not have as many components and is much more agreeable.

Priest:

Priest says that the structure of our language/theory is as such: Nodes connected by wires. The nodes are synthetic statements/beliefs and the wires are our rules of inference/rules. (Intuitively, this seems to me to be an idealistic dichotomy right off the bat, but let us allow it for now.) He claims these to be analytic, and says they are much like grammatical rules, formed by convention. This is a very guarded and difficult-to-attack view, for Priest is taking shelter in what Quine himself has often proclaimed universal ignorance on-the process of learning to learn. "A relationship between two objects cannot be a third object"; and so these rules are, in my view, not so much conditional if-then statements but, perhaps, something more like Wittgenstein's unspeakables. But our rules of inference can most certainly evolve with us; how can we accommodate for an analytic statement changing itself? I think we must then perhaps view ourselves as speaking an entirely different language then, since analyticity is relative to a given language.

Okay, let's take stock of the two arguments.

Quine has notably said that certain analytic statements can exist, but only those in which we do something like introducing novel notation for the sake of abbreviation; and we may say that the statement "'Etc.' means 'etcetera'" is analytic. In other words, tautologies.

Now, Priest's rules represent what Wittgenstein called the boundaries to our logic. But are these tautologies?

In fact, from the Wittgensteinian point of view, they were-and they were all one could say (or *show*) about the world.

And so perhaps we can reconcile the two.

Quine, Willard V. O. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. *Philosophical Review* 60 (1):20–43.

Priest, Graham. "Two Dogmas of Quineanism." *The Philosophical Quarterly* (1950-) 29, no. 117 (1979): 289-301. doi:10.2307/2219445.