1. Socrates

The value of life cannot be estimated. The question of interest is, rather, *why* a certain age offers life a certain valuation. The Socratic valuation reads: *It is no good.* What does this tell us? What is it a symptom of?

Symptoms of decadence, the preponderance of the logical faculties, the malignity of the misshapen, ulterior motives, underground currents. But all these instincts were essentially anti-Greek, anti-nobility! (See the Birth of Tragedy for more: The Socratic archetype is discussed as a destructor of the Greek tragedy.)

And so, were Socratic irony and dialectic the expression of a slave revolt (as explicated in the Genealogy of Morals)? The question is—for some reason—left hanging.

As a denier of life, Socrates repelled; but he also fascinated.

He fascinated in a twofold way, by: Exemplifying the problem of the instincts turning on themselves in an excess which was taking over the Athenian culture in general (again, touched upon in BoT); appearing as a solution to the problem by way of his exquisite mastery of the self.

To vanquish the tyranny of the instincts and master himself, Socrates found it necessary to create a counter-tyrant; and this was none other than *reason*. "There were only two alternatives: either perish or else be absurdly rational."

But what was the price he had to pay for this mode of self-mastery? All that has changed is the mode of expression of the degeneracy. He plunged into yet another disease; one cannot "extricate [oneself] from degeneration by merely waging war upon it". The section wraps up with Nietzsche telling us that happiness must be the same as instinct, and we move on to finding out in exactly what way reason is a disease.

(N.B.: It is important to keep in mind that Nietzsche ultimately had the *greatest* of respect for Socrates. In his earlier works, Nietzsche expresses clear admiration for the Socratic self-mastery spoken of above; given his own untimeliness, Socrates did what he ought. Socratism was *necessary*— even in the Birth of Tragedy, it appears as a stepping stone to something greater.)

2. Reason

The first 'idiosyncrasy' in all philosophers: Their emphasis on Being over Becoming, and their consequent repudiation of the reality of the body. (However, Heraclitus, who also repudiated the reality of the body, did it for the opposite reason—and thus got it half right: He thought the body revealed things in too much permanence and unity.)

"Reason is the cause of our falsifying the evidence of the senses." In the final analysis, our senses are what delimit how far our scientific triumphs can go; denying them is a sign of decadence.

The second idiosyncrasy in all philosophers: "Confusing the last and the first things." The 'highest' concept is the most remote from our senses; and sense-data itself is of the lowest rank. And since something of high rank cannot have grown out of the lowest, it must, it is concluded be *causa sui*.

The way our eyes trick us into believing that the sun rises and sets, it is the very structure of our language which tricks us into believing in a metaphysics of Being. "I fear we shall never be rid of God, so long as we still believe in grammar." Our language handles the categories of reason so well that we're fooled into believe that the latter must have come from some higher world.

3. Morality

Nietzsche resumes the theme of people trying to temper the stupidity of the passions with yet another stupidity. While the Socratic counter-tyrant was reason, the Christian way of destroying the passions was by a *castration*. (Of course, these need not be mutually exclusive ways of hostility towards life.)

Paradoxically, only people incapable of being these castrating ascetics find it necessary to be ascetics; because they are too weak to be moderate, they have to resort to such radical remedies.

The *correct* method to temper the stupidity of the passions is (according to him) something he calls the 'spiritualization' of the passions. Now, what does that mean?

Nietzsche explains using a specific passion: Hostility.

In its hostility, the Church wished to blindly destroy all its enemies. Its ideal is the 'peace of the soul', referring to a state in which one is no longer torn between instincts at enmity with one another.

However, the spiritualizers of hostility recognize the self-preservative and creative value of having enemies: "Only as a contrast does [one] *become necessary.*" Only when one's soul is the battleground for live and opposing instincts and values can one be truly productive. (This idea recurs in GoM.)

Nietzsche subsequently offers a number of enigmatic alternative interpretations to the phrase 'peace of the soul', but I'm not really sure about what's going on there.

A principle: "Every sound morality is ruled by a life instinct." Christian morality is a *mutiny against life,* and here Nietzsche reiterates what he said early on in the text: The question of whether or not this mutiny is justified is not even to be raised; what matters is that this mutiny, as a symptom, indicates a definite kind of life (a declining, enfeebled and exhausted life).

To generalize from Christianity: No morality which offers laws of the form "One should be x" is sound, for two reasons:

1. Even one individual is far too multifarious for it.
2. To ask even one to change is tantamount to asking that which was *necessary* to change; and for this, everything must change.

The immoralist speaks: Only moralities which say *yea* to things are not errors.

4. Causality

1. Cause and effect: "The intrinsic perversion of reason." Remember, one of the two idiosyncrasies in philosophers was: "Confusing the first and the last things."
   Morality/religion says: "Do this and that, and you will be happy." Or, "This party committed a mistake and met its death."
   Nietzsche's inversion says: "You are a happy person by constitution; therefore, you are *compelled* to do this and that." Or, "This party's will has degenerated to its last throes, which is why it is *capable* of making (and ultimately makes) its fatal mistake."

2. False causality: We believed in the causality of the will. But where did this belief come from? The only thing the will really does is *accompany* processes—and not *actuate* them. The critique here is Humean at heart: The 'inner world' posited to ground causality is unreal; because we have no *direct experience* of causality, it is imaginary and has no meaning. Nietzsche goes on to suggest that it is on the basis of this false causality that a whole host of metaphysical ideas, such as the thing-in-itself, are rooted.

3. Imaginary causes: The 'instinct' of causality (which, as we will see later, is stimulated by fear) is nothing but an idea suggested by a particular state of the senses. This instinct is stimulated in proportion to the number of general sensations we experience, for we become 'conscious' of these sensations only after our memory steps in and attributes a cause. Nietzsche says we do this because one's fundamental instinct is to get rid of unpleasant circumstances, which is what the grounding of the unfamiliar in the familiar achieves. In this case, relief ends up as the criterion of truth. "The result is that a certain manner of postulating causes…finally reigns supreme."

4. Free will: An invention of the persecutors, in order to justify their persecution; in order to trace guilt and inflict punishment upon individuals by holding them 'responsible'.

Having rid ourselves of purpose, responsibility, the causing will, and causation itself, what are we left with? The restoration of the *innocence* of Becoming, the *fatality* of Being as a whole, and the *necessity* of Existence as part of the whole.