

## 1. The Tragic

Heidegger and Nietzsche are both historical philosophers. Heidegger, the metaphysician, was concerned with the history of Being; Nietzsche, with the history of Values.

Such a history, enumerated through the value of these values, is called evaluation. The *value* of these values: History is not a fat stack of information waiting to be evaluated by someone. No genealogy is indifferent to its own origin.

Again, does Nietzsche anticipate Heidegger's propensities, by rebelling against both a 'high' foundation for values (Platonism: but must not origins have a value?) and a 'causal' derivation (psychologism—the English psychologists: but must not values have an origin)? Rejecting the two ends, they have to carve out a meaningful position for themselves.

In both these accounts, there is an apparent necessity whose essential *contingency* is revealed through genealogy. The inclusion of contingency, perhaps, is where genealogy can begin to truly distinguish itself from other accounts; this contingency runs all the way down to and can only be understood through wills warring for power.

Pluralism seems to be the beating heart of the Deleuzian philosophy. The death of God is nothing but the unveiling of pluralism, of gods. Here, also, is a certain holism in Nietzsche: To speak of *a* force is to speak of the whole network of forces which can take possession of an object and impose their interpretation unto it.

Pluralism is not the blind affirmation of all that there could be. Picture a fabric, from which one could carefully separate out and inspect the finely twined threads, each as unique as could be. This is the pluralist project upon mankind.

The history of an object is the various senses it has been given by the forces which have dominated it by overthrowing their predecessors. (Must all forces be antagonistic towards one another?)

This does not amount to the second Karamazov's 'Everything is permitted' dictum. Not any force can possess any object; each has affinities. Domination is an art. One must imitate the ruler to overthrow them, the way one must first imitate sleep in order to subsequently become one with it. What a strange idea Deleuze now expresses: The philosopher imitates the ascetic and the wise, in order not to frighten the world with his strange and bizarre *anti-wisdom*; the mask must be worn in order to survive, until such time as a force emerges which can rip it off and expose the philosopher for what they are. The activity of domination is as delicate, subtle, and tricky as that of falling asleep can be.

But the dominated object is already the apparition of a force. One gets a sense of Deleuze trying to describe an interconnectedness at a most fundamental level between these forces. This critique of force-atomism runs as deep as possible. And we now also see that forces must not always be antagonistic towards one another: For a force can have an affinity towards an object. Is this added dimension to Nietzsche's theory a Deleuzian invention? Perhaps.

Forces are related to one another through what Deleuze calls the *differential element*, a concept left opaque for the moment, through which the notion of the will emerges. The will is not the force. It is more dynamic. The will is the difference between the forces, the difference which moves those forces.

The will is also thereby authentically plural: Nietzsche's big break with Schopenhauer's unified will, "the authentically Schopenhauerian mystification".

Genealogy is the movement from interpretation, which speaks of the dominating force, to evaluation, which seeks to understand the hierarchy of forces.

The relation between forces cannot be a dialectical one, for forces affirm their difference, in opposition to the dialectical negation. With the characteristic Nietzschean reflexivity, one may question what it is in the dialectician which makes them unable to affirm this difference, and posit the opposition as a reactive force through the negation.

Thus, Nietzsche says later regarding the Birth of Tragedy's structure: 'It smells offensively Hegelian.' But even in this semi-dialectical framework, Nietzsche congratulated himself on making two important steps forward: The affirmative character of Dionysius, and the discovery of an opposition between Dionysius and Socrates, which would eventually bloom into the *true* opposition, once he identifies his real enemy: Dionysius versus the crucified.

The chasm between Dionysius and the Christian is borne their attitudes towards suffering: For the Christian, suffering calls for a justification; on its basis life is held guilty, accused; existence is thereby stripped of its existence. Suffering in life is a contradiction, its existence requiring reconciliation.

But the Dionysian is '*something higher than all reconciliation*': Affirmation. Restoring unto existence its essential innocence. It—*somehow*—sees suffering as not making life blameworthy. But how? That is, of course, the big question mark which led some interpreters into making the absurd error of thinking Nietzsche believes we can only affirm suffering by putting up some sort of illusory cope over it (although I do agree that this was the sort of solution that he initially gave, in the Birth of Tragedy). Deleuze, at least, seems to clearly see that this cannot be it.

However, his elucidation is also somewhat obscure; outside of a reference to the tragic (which is the special means of affirmation) and its aesthetic nature, I cannot make much of it.

Schopenhauer and the Greeks take a step ahead of the Christians by seeing existence as blameworthy, but by attributing responsibility to (in the case of the Greeks) the Gods, rather than mankind. But in Christianity, God goes from taking upon himself the guilt to taking upon himself the punishment; and responsibility comes crashing down onto man.

In any case, they all fail to find the innocence of existence. This was Nietzsche's move.

What follows are the most difficult and profound sections of the first chapter, which in fact prompted me to make these more elaborate notes on the text. Let me now try, very carefully. I would've usually given up, but I've been breaking my head over it this time because I feel I can sense its profundity.

The key to the cipher is the innocence of becoming and the becoming of existence (or, put another way, the affirmation of becoming).

First, let us begin understanding the nature of Becoming. When we affirm Becoming, we do not want to affirm it in the manner of an essence. Life has all the dynamism of a game, but the rules of the game are always changing! This is how we affirm the Being of Becoming without slipping into the old error.

It is only *because* the rules of the game are always changing, this truth of Becoming, that we are able to have a genuine multiplicity of forces in all their original indeterminacy, a multiplicity of forces which do not converge to a particular solution.

But Deleuze proposes that this very multiplicity is what affirms a unity. This has to do with the fact that we do not want to affirm the being of a family of different games with different rules; rather, we say it is all part of one and the same processual creative activity.

Armed with this understanding of becoming, let us return for a moment to the question of existence and innocence. The failure of a particular interpretation (splitting the will in two, etc.) has led us to

deem existence guilty. But this is what makes us bad players, storming out of the game after losing one round, thinking it finished.

But existence is innocent: *For the game goes on*. Innocence here understood not in a moral but in an *aesthetic* sense.

The game goes on, and not out of hubris: Out of lightness of being, the spirit of playfulness, the desire to play.

It possesses three moments. The first, brought on by *becoming*, constitutes the game itself. The second, brought on by the *being* of becoming, ensures that the game goes on. The third, brought on by the being of *becoming*, enforces that constant dynamism upon the rules of the game. The second and third moments merge to form the *return* of the game (the eternal return): but always of a *different* game (thus, the destruction of the opposition between chaos and the cycle).

To understand the eternal return in this sense, one must understand the dicethrow: Affirming necessity in chance.

The bad player says that if he throws the dice up enough number of times, his desired combination will ultimately occur, by the laws of causality. But this inability to affirm chance, the clinging to the web of reason, will lead to a failure of the fallen, fragmented dice from being reunited and brought back. (Thus, the loss of one round/failure of the desired number being produced leading to the player's storming out, thinking it finished...)

The only way to bring back the dicethrow is to see the number produced as the *fatality* it is. *Nothing is predetermined; but when it happens, it could not have been any other way*. We immerse ourselves entirely into the new game chanced upon; we leave the past innocent, and the future unpredictable.

Thus, the dicethrow has two moments: The throw high up in the sky, leaving it all up to chance; and the fall back down to the ground, rushing headfirst towards its fatal conclusion.

Affirming being in becoming; unity in multiplicity; necessity in chance; chaos in the cycle.

Not only is this finally progress towards understanding how one may affirm suffering; I also get the sense that this understanding of Nietzsche somewhat exonerates him from the discomfort I had long had about his philosophy in my mind. For the question was: Are we to deem anything acceptable so long as it is undertaken by an active force, a dominating will? Not quite; a Nietzschean may, at this point, say merely that the activity is a genuine part of the game of becoming; but we are free to oppose it, expose it as the filth it is, and overthrow it; there will also occur dicethrows whose fatal outcome is injustice.

*When Nietzsche wonders what led him to choose the character of Zarathustra he finds three very different reasons of unequal value. The first is Zarathustra as prophet of the eternal return; but Zarathustra is not the only prophet, not even the one who best foresaw the true nature of what he foretold. The second reason is polemical; Zarathustra was the first to introduce morality into metaphysics, the one who made morality a force, a cause and an end par excellence; he is therefore the best placed to denounce the mystification, the error of this morality itself. But an analogous reason would apply to Christ; who is more suitable than Christ to play the role of the antichrist...and of Zarathustra himself? The third reason is retrospective but enough on its own, it is the beautiful reason of chance, "Today I learned by chance what Zarathustra means; star of gold. This chance enchants me." (Letter to Gast, 20th May 1883.)*

Heraclitus thought all arose from fire. In Nietzsche's mouth, the Heraclitean fire machine deepens in symbolic significance. The fire symbolizes constant transformation; the fire 'heats' the multiplicity of chance, and is necessary to bring back the dicethrow.

*Typology* is Deleuze's name for the kind of project Nietzsche undertakes. It is not psychological; rather, our psychology depends on our being trapped by the spirit of revenge; nor is it historical, for it is, rather, what drives our history; and likewise for metaphysics. It stands behind them all.

## 2. Active and Reactive

Most of our sciences focus exclusively on reactive forces, but thereby fail to see them in the capacity of a force, for doing that would require an eye to the active force dominating it. Consciousness, per Nietzsche, is a reactive force. The terrifically interesting suggestion here is that the *body*, understood appropriately, is the dominating activity. There is also something of a reversal of a Levinas here: For Levinas, consciousness is the dominating power, subduing the nonintentional.

Deleuze also makes some slightly technical and abstract points. Quality (active/reactive) is the difference in quantity between two forces. To try and eliminate the former amounts to “an annulment of [their] difference”.

“Heraclitus is obscure because he leads us to the threshold of the obscure: what is the being of becoming? *Return is the being of that which becomes.*”

Deleuze has a compelling understanding of the eternal return (as a foundation for pure becoming, the being of becoming). It cannot, in the first place, be understood mechanistically, for that is a way of thinking which fails to acknowledge differentiation (the differences ‘cancel out’ in the final and initial state). Pure becoming is, by its very name, inconsistent with initial and terminal states. The eternal return cannot be underpinned by a principle of identity; rather, the return itself is what underpins (or constitutes) being.

There can be no negotiation in facing up to the thought of pure becoming. The present can only pass if it coexists as past and future. This is what leads us to the doctrine of the eternal return. The eternal return is *the repetition of difference*.

The next few sections make clearer a number of things said in the first chapter.

The will to power is introduced as that which gives rise to the quantitative difference between forces (the differential element), as well as the qualitative aspect of each force (the genetic element). Depending on how chance brings forces into relation, this amorphous and plastic will to power takes up an appropriate shape to interpret the event.

But there are many shapes it can adopt; the two primary ones are what Nietzsche calls *affirmative* and *negative*. (Forces are active/reactive, wills are affirming/negative.) An active force can be seen as the *means* by which an affirming will interprets the world per its values (and likewise the complicity between reactive/negative).

But the truly *Nietzschean* move, the one which always left me impressed with him, is to take *another* step back, and move from interpreting to also *evaluating*: Questioning the *value* of the will which interprets.

So, the overall picture I’m getting is that the quality of the differential element depends on the value of the interpreting will. I don’t yet understand how this principle of synthesis is supposed to tie together the will to power and the eternal return, though.

There is more to be said about the relation between forces. Its nature will also depend on how each force can be affected by others (there is no such thing as *a* force). This allows us to speak of an *affectivity* of the will to power; put otherwise, a *feeling of power*. Articulated in an obscure line: “The will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* [feeling/affectivity/sensibility].”

Being-affected is the becoming of force. The Nietzschean pessimism: Mankind will never be able to surpass becoming-reactive. Becoming-reactive is what makes the eternal return a nauseating impossibility.

The chapter ends on another difficult note which I must try and untangle.

We are now dealing with the question of the possibility of a becoming-active of forces. The essential claim seems to be that the coming of the eternal return *transmutes* our ways of feeling, leading that which is nihilistic to negative itself, to self-destruct; the triumph of the active. (This transmutation is what Deleuze calls the 'second' selection, the first whittling away lesser-developed reactive forces.)

The eternal return was the being of becoming. The nihilistic will needs it to become whole. But *becoming-reactive has no being*; for the being of becoming cannot be affirmed of a becoming that is itself nihilistic.

And yet, Deleuze did say earlier that it is the will to power which synthesizes forces in the eternal return. Does the eternal return transmute nihilistic sensibilities, or do active sensibilities produce the eternal return? Or are they somehow both producing and transmuted simultaneously?

### 3. Critique

By now, we are familiar with Nietzsche's critique of our sciences as being reactive, and his call to make them active. But what does this really mean?

Deleuze posits that an active science will have three well-defined aspects. As a *symptomatology*, it seeks to understand phenomena in terms of symptoms, and to uncover the forces they are symptoms of. As a *genealogy*, it evaluates the origin of forces. And as a *typology*, it...OK, I'm not sure about this one. I think it's supposed to investigate the nature of the will which gives rise to the quality of forces.

Another of Nietzsche's innovations is to disrupt the age-old canonical form of metaphysical questioning, the "What is—?", with "Which one is—?". What this shows is that the essence of a thing is not that Platonic immutable; it is the plurality of forces and wills it has affinities with.

I have always been upset with the somewhat vulgar idea that Nietzsche's philosophy declares all to strive after a maximum of power, and was delighted to see Deleuze now categorically dismantle this notion. *It is not that the will wants power.*

Why is this understanding incorrect? The first reason is somewhat obscure; it is because power is something represented—and only the slave conceives of the will as desiring an object of representation. Second, because it envisions pre-established values the will seeks to attribute to itself—but Nietzsche's whole point is that the will to power *creates* new values. Thirdly and most evocatively, because the idea of strife or combat in order to achieve dominance is utterly foreign to the will to power. Struggle and triumph are something only the slave engages in. Only established values can be at war; but the will to power is creative genius.

There's an interesting interpolation of Schopenhauer in the next passage. I'm not familiar enough with the broader context (Hegel, Kant, etc.) to appreciate this entirely but here's how it goes: The 'discovery' that the will strives after power (or some such object of recognition) provokes the philosopher to add on a limitation to the will to make it livable and resolve the contradiction of its apparently infinite desire. Schopenhauer was the only one who drew out the consequences of the old philosophy to its extreme and fatal end; there is no 'contractual' limitation; there is a *mystical suppression*, and the will denies its own self...

So, what does the 'power' in will to power signify? Power is 'the one' that wills (I am reminded very much of Heidegger's *das Man*). It is *through* power that the will bestows 'sense and value'. This monism of the will to power pulses at the same time as a pluralism of typology; a type refers not only to the quality of a force but also to the relation between the qualified forces (triumph of the reactive, for example).

Kant's conception of critique is insufficient because it is still subordinate to the established values of reason, morality, and the like. He tried to make reason tribunal and accused at the same time; he wanted to understand reason's role as tribunal. Nietzsche wants to dethrone reason as tribunal, but this does not mean it remains accused; we merely want to understand who made reason tribunal.

"The point of critique is not justification but a different way of feeling: another sensibility." This is a very interesting statement. Recall how the notion of *feeling* first showed up as a way to characterise the sensitivity of the will to a force's capacity for being affected by others. What could a different way of feeling signify? Changing its capacity for being affected; a certain way of affectivity *is* the becoming of a force, the changing of the way a force relates to others (from obeying to commanding?); the new way of feeling is becoming-active.

We now enter Nietzsche's dazzling analysis of the will to truth. Deleuze takes us along seeing it as speculative position (the desire to not deceive) to moral opposition (the world *sans* deceit as the better one) to ascetic ideal (the lies of this life as *contradictory* to life) to nihilism (finally, life set against itself).

The will to truth is only the latest rendition of the ascetic ideal. Before this, it appeared in the guise of morality; and before that, in the guise of religion. With these cascading inferences against itself, the ascetic ideal will soon run out of characters to play, and we shall ultimately be able to change ideals.

I think the following is an idea that I absorbed fairly explicitly when I read the Birth of Tragedy, but it's nice to revisit it: Nietzsche tires of aesthetics from the point of view of the disinterested spectator; he wants an aesthetics of creation. Deleuze calls this his tragic conception of art.

The chapter ends with an extended discussion on thought. Deleuze first presents the old image of thought; as something essentially directed towards truth, and occasionally sent to error from without. But truth is not an abstract universal, it is a realisation of the value of what we think, informed by the sense of the forces acting upon our thought; and thought is intrinsically bound up not with truth and falsity but with noble and base.

The idea of truth as abstract universal is one in servitude to established powers. But philosophy must always question, unsettle and disturb such established powers. "The use of philosophy is to *sadden*." Philosophy is neither eternal nor historical: It is *untimely*, always at odds with the present time.

What we want are forces which will make thinking *active*. The suggestion given is that this can only be done through violence; the violence of culture (insofar as it is not appropriated by the reactive). (I am reminded of another kind of violence, which purports to make thinking free: That of a koan. Deleuze also mentions Heidegger's ideas on thinking authentically—which, for Heidegger, was triggered by koan-like shocks—as originating in Nietzsche here.) Truths (and even falsities) may be noble or base, but free thought is always untimely.



#### **4. From *Ressentiment* to Bad Conscience**

*Ressentiment* is revealed to be stronger than just reaction. There are reactions which are *acted*, and these are ones which obey the active; but there is another type which does prevail over active forces. Deleuze says that this kind of reaction is *felt*, rather than acted.

The former are part of the reactive 'conscious', and the latter, the reactive 'unconscious'. The former give active forces the *material conditions* (an interestingly specific phrase to use here) required for their functioning; they are memoryless, and are always with regards to present excitations. The latter do not possess the faculty of forgetting: 'Traces' accumulate, and this kind of reaction is always with regards to them. An interesting upshot of this narrative is that the *real* struggle was always between two kinds of *reactive* forces; and when the latter triumph, active forces also end up losing their footing.

This loss of plasticity which precludes *ressentiment* seems to be viewed as greatly disastrous by Deleuze. Someone who is unfortunate enough to have their traces rise to the conscious is consumed by anguish, for they impute upon every event hateful chains of causation; and this framework makes everything strike too deeply, and incites within them an endless need for revenge. For *ressentiment*, the traces are its topology, the way in which it escapes activity; the slave is its typology, the way in which it takes on form.

To be clearer, it takes on form in the slave by committing the following three errors: Separating a force from what it can do (a great example: 'light shines'—can it do anything but?); projecting the force onto a subject which wills it; accusing the subject of manifesting a force it could have chosen not to. This project of mystification, fictionalisation and accusation are its means of manifestation as the slave's mentality; a project undertaken by the artistic genius of the Judaic priest, who allows the slave to finally and truly express the traces which have won him over.

Well, now that active forces have been deprived of their material conditions, what happens to them? This is where bad conscience enters the narrative: Forces turning inwards, *introjection*, self-flagellation. This introjection is the continuation and logical climax of the reactive projection mentioned before; bad conscience "takes over" the job of *ressentiment*.

This multiplication of pain via interiorisation is the first, topological, aspect of bad conscience. The typological one, which describes how it is made manifest, is through a *feeling of guilt*. Once again, an artistic genius is necessary to allow this movement; in this case, it is the Christian priest. The direction of *ressentiment* is altered from outwards to inward. There is no contradiction here; this final twist is the fatal destiny of the original contagion.

We have seen the fictions through which the Judaic priest allows the typological aspect of *ressentiment* to come forth. There are similar fictions employed by the Christian priest in the context of the typological aspect of bad conscience. Apparently, the latter has something to do with what is called culture.

Prehistoric: While the content of culture is arbitrary, its form is essential to humankind's species-activity. It trains man to act his reactive forces. Pain and punishment are hypothesised to be components of this training.

Posthistoric: The product of culture is someone who can take *responsibility* and make *promises* because his responsibility and promises are not in the face of a higher law but his own autonomy. "Culture is man's species activity; but, since this activity is selective, it produces the individual as its final goal, where species itself is suppressed."

Historic: The process itself is turbulent. Reactive forces take over and invert the product of culture. This triumph is a necessary part of 'universal history'. Culture aims to put reactive forces in the service of the active; but intermediately, reactive ends up in service of reactive, *ressentiment* is born, and history happens.

Deleuze asks again: How can *ressentiment* turn inwards while maintaining its nature? By taking what it gets from species-activity/culture and constructing associations within, reactive forces form a herd; and it is in this milieu that the introjection takes place. What started off as an unending debt towards 'divinity' (the projection of debt) turns into the guilt of the debtor. And to be able to survive through this guilt, we are also given the antidote of 'service to God'; the fiction of a world-beyond.

## 5. The Overman

We have understood nihilism as that which denies life and values fictions branded as superior to it. We shall call this *negative nihilism*, for it leads to a second variety of nihilism: *Reactive nihilism*.

The atheist, 'the ugliest man', who cannot bear the shame of having his sins exhibited in front of God, turns into God's murderer, denies all forms of the supersensible. God dies of pity, of His shameless pity, for the weak and reactive: The will to nothingness.

But from this reactive nihilism stems yet another form: *Passive nihilism*. The descendant of God's murderer is 'the last man'. An exhausted life which gives up willing altogether: Nothingness of will. (Nietzsche finds this to be characterised by democratic and socialist ideology.)

God is dead. But... 'when gods die, they always die many kinds of deaths.'

First sense: Driven by the Judaic consciousness, which puts God to death in the person of the son; only so that the antithesis of love and hate can be united in *ressentiment*. The Father puts the son to death in order to make him independent of himself and the Jewish people.

Second sense: The hateful premises of the Father dies, and the Son of universal love (love of the reactive life) is reborn.

Not sure where these first two are coming from, to be honest.

Third sense: Driven by Christian consciousness. The son is put to death not for independence but for the immensity of our sins.

Fourth sense: Driven by European consciousness; God dies of pity (reactive nihilism).

Fifth sense: Driven by Buddhist consciousness. The true lesson of Christ; death of the reactive life.

The dialectic underwent a number of transformations before meeting its demise with Nietzsche:

First, Hegel's alienation and reappropriation. Then, Feuerbach's attempt at an improvement, still grounded in those two things, criticised by Marx. Finally, Stirner's extreme nihilism, taking the dialectic to its logical conclusion. The Nietzschean paradigm replaces it with transvaluation and overcoming.

I said earlier: "Culture aims to put reactive forces in the service of the active; but intermediately, reactive ends up in service of reactive." Deleuze now elaborates on this: Humans, all-too-human, miss the power of affirming required to see activity through. Becoming-reactive is the essence of the human; the brief rise of the active man is only in order to hasten his inevitable denigration into the reactive.

It is now time to reveal the great secret: Becoming-active. "*How can nihilism be defeated?*"

The key lies in the following: That all the forms of nihilism hitherto understood by Nietzsche are an *incomplete* form of nihilism. *Transmutation* completes nihilism, and a *completed nihilism*: This is self-defeating. We must understand what these claims mean in turn.

### 1. Nihilism is incomplete:

Nihilism expresses the knowable quality (*ratio cognoscendi*) (sickness and suffering) of the will to power. Its completion involves affirming the essential quality (*ratio essendi*) (affirmation) of the will to power.

"*The thought of the eternal return goes beyond all the known laws of our knowledge.*"

Nihilism wants to destroy all values (of the old element): But this can only be done by changing the element from which the value of values derives.

## 2. Transmutation completes nihilism:

Transmutation is nothing but that change in the element, from the *ratio cognoscendi* into the *ratio essendi*.

It is not merely substitution of one element with the other. This next bit is obscure: The reactive man breaks alliance with the will to nothingness and moves to a nothingness of the will; but simultaneously, the will to nothingness breaks alliance with reactive forces, and inspires in man *the inclination to destroy himself actively*.

This is the movement from 'the last man' to 'the man who wants to perish', the man of active destruction.

## 3. Completed nihilism is self-defeating:

The power of affirmation which destroys, the sacrifice of all reactive forces.

Affirmation and negation are inseparable, entrenched within the will to power. Negation precedes affirmation (the destruction of man) and follows it (the destruction of all known values). Affirmation creates two negations.

The image of the ass is used for one who does not know how to say nay. Affirmation does not equal blind affirmation; the burden of known values (the burden of the real) must be shaken off. The ass answers yes always, and so it ends up always being to nihilism. This misconception may arise from the idea that affirmation is function of being; of all that is. But the real itself is manufactured by the dialectic, says Deleuze.

Affirmation is not acceptance (of the real): It is *creation*. It is becoming, in the sense of the first chapter. We must *set free what lives* and *invent new forms of life*. The human limit lies at the former, and falls short of the latter. Reinvent the game, again and again. Restore mystification into the mundane, again and again.

Being is not an object of affirmation. Affirmation delineates the boundaries of being.

Affirmation is left with no object to affirm—but itself. This is the double affirmation. From becoming to the being of becoming. The eagle and the serpent; Dionysus-Ariadne.

"Negation is *opposed* to affirmation but affirmation *differs* from negation." In the Deleuzian sense, becoming is an authentic multiplicity, multiplicity as difference (of one thing from another). This multiplicity is introduced in the primary affirmation, and the difference established in the second affirmation (from multiplicity to multiplicity *as* difference—even our grammar reflects this). Affirmation always returns; the eternal return is the being of difference.

The structure of the double affirmation is also reflected in the relationship between Zarathustra and Dionysus.

Zarathustra is primary affirmation, becoming, the lion, he who says nay to all known values and causes the eternal return. But he is not yet its equal, he prophesies what he himself is not yet ripe for.

Dionysus is the double affirmation, being of becoming, the lion become child, creator of new values. In an obscure passage, Deleuze explains how the Dionysian principle subjects Zarathustra to the eternal return:

“Thus in Zarathustra’s exposition it is always the entanglement of causes or the connection of moments, the synthetic relation of moments to each other, which determines the hypothesis of the return of the same moment. But, from Dionysus’ perspective by contrast, it is the synthetic relation of the moment to itself, as past, present and to come, which absolutely determines its relations with all other moments. The return is not the passion of one moment pushed by others, but the activity of the moment which determined the others in being itself determined through what it affirms.”