

Being & Time: Division One

Lecture 1

Standing on the shoulders of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: ["There's something wrong with the whole tradition which is trying to have some kind of theoretical understanding of what human beings are."] Dreyfus thinks: You *can* do this with the natural sciences.

The atomistic view of being (very anti-Merleau-Ponty): 'Pieces of being' are independent of each other. Properties are unaffected by what substance they appear in, nor by each other; substances are unaffected by each other.

Aristotle: To be is to be a substance.

The first way of being: Presence-at-hand is the way of being of substances (self-sufficient, atomistic way of being). Developing subject-predicate logic, you can formally describe everything with substance ontology. (But AI failed when it tried to develop this.)

Heidegger: Takes the simplest holism, that of our world/experience and shows substance and property are derivative from 'this': The other way of Being, that of equipment. A hammer couldn't *be* a hammer if there weren't nails, people with the skill to pound nail into it, etc. You cannot absorb it into the substance ontology by adding the "being for hammering" property: This leaves the notion of "hammering" opaque.

The second way of being: Readiness-to-hand; the way of being of equipment. There is something which is not a property that hammers can have. If a hammer is too heavy, this is not a property it has—too heavy for what?

The third way of being: *Dasein*. To the contrary, however, philosophers used to talk about people as particular kinds of substances. Descartes' *res cogitans*, Leibniz's monads, Kant's transcendental subject, all self-sufficient substances. (Searle & Husserl too?) To know if someone is a substance ontologist, ask if they if one can doubt the existence of the external world.

Heidegger: "We are what we do; we give ourselves an identity by taking up activities (using equipment)." It gives itself an interpretation. (Example: Building a house amounts to understanding myself as a carpenter.) The name for this kind of being: *Existence*. Hammers don't exist.

Each idea of being makes sense of objects, equipment, and existence respectively. Modes of intelligibility. ["Being roughly equals intelligibility."] The primordial Being is that on the basis of which all these kinds of being are understood.

Lecture 2

Dasein: That which is in us/about us that makes 'Being' an *issue* for us. Our way of being which makes Being an issue for us is called existence. "[*Dasein*] is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it." (Although you need not always be *aware* of it or *think* about it; it just means you *behave* in a certain way—absorbed coping, what Heidegger calls *Dasein* falling.) "But in that case, this is a constitutive state of *Dasein*'s Being, and this implies that *Dasein*, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being---a relationship which itself is one of Being. *Dasein* is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological."

Ontology: The explicit understanding of Being.

Pre-ontological: Having a stance on yourself, etc., the sort of stuff out of which you *form* a discipline. You can only do fundamental ontology from within the human condition.

“The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.” Dasein has no other defining characteristics except that through our activity it gives itself a ‘nature’: This is what captures what it is to be a human being. We *provisionally* characterize it like this, and aim to investigate further to refine this. Formal indication similar to Kripke’s rigid designators.

The Dasein way of being is a style which manifests into everything. Brushing your teeth, using the equipment of the toothbrush, is a mode of being.

What some particular Dasein’s stand on its being is *existentiell*. The general structure of a thing whose way of Being is existence, is *existentiale*. This book is, therefore, an existential analytic.

Factuality: Male. Facticity: Masculine. Culturally imposed stand. Nearest (all around us) and furthest from us (thus, the hardest to see).

Ontic: Has to do with entities, properties, characteristics. Ontological: The way of being. (Pre-ontological: Unthinkingly acting out the way of being.) Present-at-hand, readiness-at-hand, existence: The three ways of being. *Fundamental* ontology: The Being that is the basis of them all.

[“Being depends on us, but beings don’t.”] We generate the modes of being, but the hammer will still remain regardless of us.

“Dasein is ontically ‘closest’ to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically surely it is not a stranger.”

Why specifically these three understandings of being? You must put it in terms of time, with its three dimensions (past, present, future). Thus, the three are unified by temporality. (‘Now’-time, pragmatic temporality, primordial temporality: They each have their unity because they are derived from each other.)

Recap: Introduction I

Three presuppositions which led to the neglect of the question of Being:

1. “‘Being’ is the ‘most universal’ concept”: Being antecedes categorial explications. But this failure naturally only means that it is the darkest concept of all.
2. “‘Being’ is indefinable”: This does not mean there is no problem; it only means Being has not the character of an entity.
3. “‘Being’...is self-evident”: But this average intelligibility of it only indicates a deeper unintelligibility.

We begin with the Fact of our vague average understanding of Being.

That which is asked about: Being. “That which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood...not itself an entity.”

That which is interrogated: Entities.

That which is to be found out by the asking: The meaning of Being.

What is the right way of access to that which is interrogated? By making transparent in its Being that entity whose very mode of Being it is a part of to ask the question of Being: And this entity is Dasein.

There is no circularity in this; we presuppose the pre-ontological Being to get at the ontological Being.

The ontological priority of the question of Being in science, an ontological framework leaps ahead and defines the milieu of the discipline by determining what domain of Being its basic concepts and objects will be in. Ontical inquiry “limps along after” and investigates the entities.

Pre-ontological: “being in such a way that one has an understanding of ‘Being’”. Thus, it is distinctive in that when considered ontically, it *is* ontological. And so, to get from the pre-ontological to the ontological, we work it out as an ontical consideration. “Whenever an ontology takes for its themes entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic.”

The ontical priority of the question of Being: Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of Being. Must be taken up ontically first to reach finally the existential analytic.

Lecture 3

Categories vs existentials:

Aristotle listed the properties of objects; a list of categories that were the properties of the substances. Kant gave 12 (causality, substance, quality, etc.).

For Heidegger, categories were the general structure of the substances. Existentialia was, on the other hand, the structure of the Dasein (*not* the subject).

But where does “equipment” fall here? Neither substance, nor Dasein. Heidegger throws them into that which has categories.

Three possible errors: Up to Heidegger, Being was always about substances. Nor is he talking about ‘Being-ness’. And ‘Being’ shouldn’t have a capital B (it isn’t any Supreme Being (?)).

Being is that which makes things intelligible—but here, ‘intelligibility’ is not a *property* in the above sense (an aspect of things; our capacity to make sense of things is our (‘average’) understanding (know-how, *not* cognitive) of being?); the basis on which beings are understood. [“*Being is the background* (world).”] Not a belief system: The light in the room. (We see things better and better when we *don’t* see the light.) Absolutely pervasive; in our bodily dispositions. And Dasein is the source of intelligibility (it is a part of its *essential constitution*).

Our basic way of being: The fundamental way in which we know to cope with the world. (Related to the universal tendency for maximal grip and the body schema.) At its most basic level, Dasein *is* just coping with the world. “Dasein is the world existing.” Inseparable. Substance is to be explained as some kind of ‘breakdown’ of this.

“How could human behavior be described? Surely only by showing the actions of a variety of humans as they are all mixed up together. Not what one man is doing now, but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions. Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning.”

-Ludwig Wittgenstein

Four senses of ‘world’:

1. 'World' as an object (universe; categorial)
2. 'World' as the way of being of the entities in the universe (universe of discourse; also categorial)
3. 'World' as a holistic collection of human practice (the business world, etc.; existential)
4. 'World' as *worldhood* (the structure of the background; the general structure of *any* world; existential)

The world of physics: #3. The physical world: #2.

Recap: Introduction II

The Dasein is ontically closest and ontologically farthest from us. The Dasein's *understanding* of being is in terms of the 'world', towards which it comports itself proximally. "The way the world is understood is reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted." We must exhibit the structures the Dasein possesses in its average everydayness.

A claim: "Whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with *time* as its standpoint. Time functions ["a distinctive ontological function"] as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being." Some preliminary evidence: "Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'."

A related claim: Dasein's essential historicity (where historicity is the state of Being that is constitutive for Dasein's historizing) makes the question of the meaning of Being a historiological one.

"In the course of...history certain distinctive domains of Being have come into view...: the *ego cogito* of Descartes, the subject, the "I", reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being...*the meaning of the Being of the 'sum'.*"

In ancient Greek ontology, Dasein's Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse.

What is phenomenology, and why is it the method of ontology?

Phenomenon: Etymologically, "That which shows itself in itself...and...that which looks like something." Both these presuppose a primordial signification of phenomenon as the manifest.

Four senses of the word 'appearance':

1. "The symptom signals the appearance of the disease": The disease which is announcing-itself but not-showing-itself (the symptom does the announcing; behind the symptom lies the disease)
2. "The symptoms appeared": It does the announcing (of the underlying disease); it is manifest and indicates something in its showing-itself. (A phenomenon in the formal sense.)
3. "The appearance of the brown table": A pure phenomenon, showing-itself-in-itself.
4. "The colour red is the appearance of the *true* nonsensory colour red in the natural world": A showing-itself which indicates something *essentially* non-manifest (unlike, perhaps, the disease). In this case, we have 'mere appearance'.

It is clear that all senses presuppose phenomenon (specified in #3).

Etymologically, the Greek word for 'semblance' is founded on the word for 'phenomenon'.

But if we define phenomenon as only a showing-itself-in-itself, we make no claim on the category of entities which could fall under it; it remains a 'formal' conception (satisfied, for example, by Kant's entities accessibly via "empirical intuition"). Is the self-showing a being or an entity?

Logos: To make something manifest; to discover something; to exhibit something; to let something be seen (by discourse, by thought, by judgement) in its 'togetherness'. Truth in discourse is not some psychic-to-physical correspondence but is merely the discovery of something presupposed. The 'locus' of truth is in Dasein, not logos.

But this limits the grasping of entities to a 'what'.

So now we have an argument which runs thus:

1. The formal conception of a phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself.
2. The 'logos' in phenomenology signifies a 'to-exhibit' such that the 'locus' of its truth is not with the logos but with Dasein.
3. Therefore, the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is something that is concealed, but at the same time is essentially belongs to what does show itself.

Phenomenology: Any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself. But now we narrow our conception of phenomenon to "the phenomenological one": That which always shows itself when something is exhibited becomes phenomenology's study; and yet, thematically always hidden and 'covered up' ("covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to 'phenomenon'"). This is nothing but Being. Thus: "*Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.* Phenomenology is the science of ontology. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology." (The latter characterizes its object and the former, its way of treating its object.)

(How can the manifest be covered up—is that not a contradiction in terms? It may be *undiscovered*, or it may be *buried over* ("there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion").)

The phenomenological *reduction* of an object leads to a *construction* towards its being and a *destruction* of the traditional concepts it is conceived under. The phenomenology of Dasein is always a hermeneutic, an interpretation of that which is hidden.

Lecture 4

The structure of the everyday world you're absorbed in:

'Coping' is not associated with a bare perceptual cognition but a kind 'concern', which has a kind of 'know-how'.

The entities populating the world can be accessed phenomenologically only by putting aside all our interpretative tendencies.

Some good articulation from a YouTube comment ('Albarnful') about there being no such thing as *an* equipment and the holism of perennially belonging to a totality (or rather, a *whole*) of equipment: "A hammer in a drawer is not a question because it is trying to grasp Heidegger objectively precisely when his point is the opposite: things and beings can be understood only against a background, only as part of a totality of beings which make sense only in relation to one another. What is a hammer in a drawer, is it in a culture which has no use for hammers or is it in a drawer in the evening after the workshop has been closed only to be picked up again in the morning for another day of hammering?"

When a tree becomes equipment in order for us to cross a river, it has to become more than just an 'in-order-to' and has to be fitted into a whole of other stuff.

Equipment (necessarily?) has suitability (a bridge can't sink into the water when you step on it), appropriateness (don't stand on chairs), and norm (don't eat grape with a fork). Dreyfus thinks: Readiness-to-hand is a broader notion than equipment. We need to distinguish the definition of equipment from its mode of being. ["A referential whole would be all the bearing (replacement to Heidegger's 'assignment') all the pieces have on each other."]

An amazing example of the thing withdrawing to be ready-to-hand: You use your clock only in order to know the time; can you tell without looking if it has Roman numerals or Arabic numerals?

Dreyfus says: You must distinguish between functioning as equipment and being used as equipment; Heidegger never seems to mention the former. Even only the former can be ready-to-hand as long as it withdraws when you use it. Or something like that. I don't really see the point of the distinction, anyway.

Is there any kind of equipment that has to become visible in order to do the job? Stay tuned to find out why Heidegger thinks there is.

The body is also a thing ready-to-hand, suggests Dreyfus, although we can replace one hammer with another hammer but not our body with another...

What is the mode of being of an equipment when it's not in use? Dreyfus is suggesting it's unready-to-hand (which does amount to the same mode of being). I really don't agree, 'just lying around' seems to be totally different from Heidegger's description of that category.

Now, Dreyfus clearly reasons why it can be neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand. He then says finally that we may just not have a name for it in Heidegger (someone else also suggests "*potentially* ready-to-hand), but I have a more dramatic idea: The only kind of being left in Heidegger is existence. Can it become part of Dasein? Can this be an indication of the impersonal body schema?

Or maybe it's just a bad question to ask.

Recap: Chapter I

Characterizing Dasein:

1. Inwardness/Being: Its 'essence' lies in its *existence* ('existence' is its kind of Being, contrasted to presence-at-hand).
2. Outwardness/The world: It is always *mine*. Dasein always takes a 'stand' on itself. Mineness is Dasein's way of *encountering* itself.

Existence and mineness will combine to produce their *a priori* groundedness of being-in-the-world as Dasein's general basic state.

Dasein should not be 'interpreted' (phenomenology) via some differentiated way of existing (its Being is an *existentialia* and not a category) but in its existential togetherness. Thus, we cannot posit the category 'subject' (for it lives the kind of being of the category either undefined or misrepresented as presence-at-hand). Point driven home by Husserl's suggestion, perhaps: The unity of the person must have a constitution essentially different from the unity of things of nature. (I believe Merleau-Ponty may disagree.)

Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness.

Our enquiry can neither disclose nor dethrone something of the empirical sciences, but merely discover and 'ontologically purify' what they already possess.

Recap: Chapter II

In the unity of 'Being-in-the-world', we may study 'the world', the entity which has 'Being-in-the-world', and 'Being-in (as such)'.

A brief survey of the third constituent:

What we have here is an existential ("the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein"), not a categorial being-in 'something' in the way of objects present-at-hand. This being-in is better characterized by "to *dwell* ", "to reside", or (my own paraphrase) "to be habituated in". Two things present-at-hand in the world are, being 'worldless' in themselves, simply not *encounterable* (the chair can never 'touch' the wall); and "an entity can 'meet up with' Dasein only in so far as it can...show itself within a *world* ."

We cannot consider things like Dasein's existential spatiality as a concatenation of the spatiality of various things present-at-hand; it is 'essential'. "All [Dasein's] ways of Being-in [the world] have *concern* as their kind of Being."

Substance ontology may be a natural mistake to make because Dasein gets its first ontological notion of Being from those entities in the world which it is not, and "knowing the world functions as the primary mode of Being-in-the-world". "Subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world."

Now, the Being of the kind of 'knowing' we *should* be speaking about belongs to (*is founded upon*) Being-in-the-world; and so there can be no problem of how the internal subject leaps out to the external object (which only happens when we equivocate knowing as knowledge of the present-at-hand). Dasein is always 'outside' alongside entities it encounters which belong in the world it discovers; and at the same time, knowing is still 'inside' Dasein as its way of Being-in-the-world.

But there seems to be something circular in this. For do we not have to *explain* how the existential nature of 'knowing' comes to the fore from its substantial/categorial nature?

Quite the contrary, the story actually tells us how the substantial nature of knowing comes about from its existential nature: When *concern* leaves us and we slip into the mode of 'just tarrying alongside', holding ourselves back from any manipulation of entities in the world. (One can no longer legitimately put forth a problem of knowledge (or rather, what "higher court" can?), for we have ripped off the conventional internal-external structure.) This act of encountering entities as they are present-at-hand is itself a way of Being-in-the-world.

"The perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it...the Dasein which knows *remains outside* , and it does so *as Dasein* ."

Lecture 5

Let us approach unreadiness-to-hand, now.

"This presence-of-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of any readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand *in this way* is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere." Now, Dreyfus thinks unreadiness-to-hand should just be another kind of Being, although Heidegger never says this explicitly.

Three modes of disturbance to the transparent ongoing coping: Conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, obstinacy.

This disturbance 'doesn't necessarily have to be a breakdown either'. "The tarrying which results from a discontinuation of one's manipulation, can take on the character of a more precise kind of circumspection, such as 'inspecting', checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the 'operations' which are now 'at a standstill'. Dreyfus cites the act of learning as an example.

["Conspicuousness must reveal things in its own unique way: Not as invisible, so to speak, and not as substances with properties."] Dreyfus thinks Heidegger doesn't "cash out" on this kind of Being enough. "When we are using a tool circumspectively, we can say, for instance, that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the proposition that the hammer is heavy can give expression to a concerned deliberation, and signify that the hammer is not an easy one—in other words, that it takes force to handle it, or that it will be hard to manipulate." Dreyfus calls this an 'aspect' of the hammer, as opposed to a 'property'. Not a 'feature' of the hammer; something you can say about it *in a context, relevant to its use*. NOT just a secondary property.

From this, we can *change over* to presence-at-hand: We may speak of the hammer having the 'property' of heaviness. "When this kind of talk is so understood, it is no longer spoken within the horizon of awaiting and retaining an equipmental totality and its involvement-relationships."

Dreyfus now talks about two kinds of presence-at-hand. We have substances, which are *desituated*, and science, which *deworlds*. You can change over once again from the former to the latter and say that the hammer has 'mass'.

The ontological question: Which of the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand are founding, and which is founded?

Causally, the present-at-hand underlies (founds) the ready-to-hand (the hammer has to have the right causal properties to be suitable for hammering) (but they don't *account* for readiness-to-hand).

But none of these makes it *intelligible* as a hammer. What founds its intelligibility is its role in the world of the coping Dasein.

Presence-at-hand is derivable from ready-to-hand, because it's what you get when you subtract all the situational properties from the latter.

Thus, they're both founded on each other; to give one a priority is a 'philosophical prejudice'.

The tentative suggestion that Heidegger was a scientific realist: "What cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too."

From 'The Metaphysics of Logic': Heidegger says that the primary purpose of Being & Time is to destroy the subject-object (or rather, self-world) distinction and replace it with the primordial essence that really is. "There is no such thing as *an* equipment": Holism.

The way that these Things in the world are related to each other in their equipmentality is that they have *reference* (bearing/being assigned) to each other. They're *involved* with each other. "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'."

1. In-order-to

2. Towards-which

3. With-which

4. In-which

5. For-the-sake-of-which

I work *with* a piece of chalk *in order to* write on the board *towards* the goal of explaining Heidegger *in* the classroom *for the sake of* making the students understand him/being a teacher.

I work *with* the hammer *in order to* hammer a nail into the wood *towards* making a frame which is relevant to a room which is...relevant to a house (which is the *primary towards-which*) *for the sake of* providing shelter for Dasein/being a homemaker.

This chain-effect is there only when something significant is being done. It's not that the Dasein makes the whole job of making the house make sense by putting a final full stop. Ants make houses too. The *for the sake of* bottomed out at being a teacher/homemaker.

[“You never arrive at being a teacher. It's always ahead of you, but in a future that'll never arrive.”] But it still coordinates your present activities. This is the for-the-sake-of-which that Heidegger has in mind. Dasein gives itself an identity by taking up being a teacher. But you can't be a teacher if you don't have the appropriate equipment. “You are what you do.” And you can't understand the *significance* of all this equipment if you can't see how it connects up with the *roles* people take in the culture.

Lecture 6

Significance: When you get the relational totality of equipment and connect it with the for-the-sake-of-which (giving it a 'point'). [“Heidegger's move to get you to the background, or familiarity.”]

“The “for-the-sake-of-which” signifies an “in-order-to”; this in turn, a “towards-this”; the latter, an “in-which” of letting something be involved; and that, in turn, the “with-which” of an involvement.”

A note on bottoming out the for-the-sake-of-which with roles: You can give up roles (pretending to be a good student). What you can't give up is your “identity”. You may not even be able to step outside and see it (a good mother); constantly organizing what you're doing.

Remember—at the end of the day, Dasein is an entity—and thus, ontical! So, we say that Dasein can discover other entities in their readiness-to-hand in the world conditional to its familiarity with significance. And this being an ontic condition.

“Heidegger offers an alternative description of experience: He argues that our fundamental experience of the world is one of *familiarity*.” From William D. Blattner's book.

The *structure* of the world is the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of-which, etc. The *phenomenon* of the world is familiarity. “The structure on the basis of which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the *worldhood* of the world.”

When I pick up the chalk to write, I *free* the chalk. The *background* isn't an entity. Therefore, Dasein isn't discoverable. I *disclose* the world and *discover* the chalk.

Primordial familiarity: That wherein Dasein already understands itself.

From Basic Problems of Phenomenology: “Transcendence is a fundamental determination of the ontological structure of Dasein. It belongs to the existentiality of existence. Transcendence is an existential concept. Intensionality is founded in Dasein's transcendence and is possible only for that

reason. The transcendence conversely cannot be explained in terms of intentionality.” Two kinds of intentionality: The Husserlian thoughtful mind-directed-to-world and primordial intentionality, which is our absorbed coping happening on the background of familiarity with the world. (The latter isn’t a kind of intentionality at all, according to Dreyfus.) “Transcendence” is an openness to the world which makes both kinds of intentionality possible.

Note: When we use a chalk, we don’t just free the chalk. We free *everything* ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand.

What’s the relation between absorbed coping and transcendence? The background itself isn’t a kind of intentionality; we free the background with primordial intentionality. The only difference is that the background lacks a towards-which (and so there isn’t any intentionality). They’re still both ways of comporting.

From Basic Problems of Phenomenology: “The task of bringing to light Dasein’s existential constitution leads first of all to the twofold task, intrinsically one, of interpreting more radically the phenomena of intentionality and transcendence.” Ontical comportment and ontological comportment.

“This familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for Dasein, and goes to make up Dasein’s understanding of Being.”

Lecture 7

The “for the sake of teaching the course” kind of for-the-sake-of is an achievable one—this is *ontic*. The *primary* ‘towards-which’—ontological—is “for the sake of understanding myself as a teacher”. The latter isn’t just another step; it’s a different level of description—for-the-sake-of-*which*.

Referential totality (totality of involvements): The whole structure of the in-order-to leads up to the for-the-sake-of some basic interest of Dasein (a possibility of Dasein’s Being). The ‘pragmatic’ side; ontic. The example: For the sake of shelter (being sheltered).

But then you add something totally different to it, and get significance.

Significance: The whole activity of coping with the referential totality leads up to the way Dasein takes a stand on its Being. (Being a shelterer—a Being of Dasein.) Ontological. (Or should we say: Existential?) Existing is taking/having (and not *choosing*—not even unconsciously, says Dreyfus; one just grows up with a ‘style of behavior’) a stand on your Being.

Do you only need the referential totality to disclose the ready to hand and the present at hand? If we need significance, why do we need this Being which takes a stand on itself to give us worldhood? (Does Heidegger’s answer to this tell us something about his scientific realism? Dreyfus indicates that he thinks we *do* need significance—i.e., Involvement+Significance=Worldhood.)

“The existential nature of [Dasein] is the reason why [Dasein] can represent things as such and why [Dasein] can be conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes existence as the essence of [Dasein]. Consciousness does not itself create the openness of Being; nor is it consciousness that makes it possible for [Dasein] to stand open for beings. Wither and whence and in what free dimension could the intentionality of consciousness move if being-in-the-world was not the essence of man in the first place?” Heidegger’s words; in Kaufmann’s anthology on existentialism.

Approaching Heidegger’s critique of Descartes:

1. Naturalism (reducing consciousness to atoms) is impossible

2. Cartesianism (positing a ghostly mind to account for consciousness; dualism) is impossible
3. Cognitivism (using mental elements to make a representation of the world in the mind and then generate behavior) is impossible

Traditional ontology: Starts with nature and asks what else we have to add onto it to get the world. Heidegger says: The way of asking the question is wrong; the holistic coping is what's actually basic.

"Such a letting-something-be-seen is possible on the basis of a letting-something-be-encountered, and this is possible only on the basis of always already being-involved-with. Only an entity which in its being has the aptitude to let another entity (world) be encountered stands in the possibility of apprehending something, of knowledge. Knowing is nothing but a mode of being-in-the-world; specifically, it is not even a primary but a founded way of being-in-the-world, a way which is always possible only on the basis of a non-cognitive comportment. Worldhood *cannot* be read off from mere nature. The environmental references, in which nature is present primarily in a worldly way, tell us rather the reverse: nature as reality can only be understood on the basis of worldhood. The entitative relationships of dependence of worldly entities among themselves do not coincide with the founding relationships in being." ["You can *explain* everything, but you can't *understand* it. Science is fine, but naturalism is impossible."]

"Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities in Nature. This manner of knowing them has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way. 'Nature', as the categorial aggregate of those structures of Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never make *worldhood* intelligible."

But Descartes doesn't claim this at all: He thinks it's explained by the *res cogitans*; his dualism.

Lecture 8

Heidegger thinks it's *impossible* for science to ignore the phenomena and just 'finesse' the secondary qualities. The argument: You can't make sense of the present-at-hand except against the background of worldhood (and the ready-to-hand). But this doesn't mean electrons didn't exist before us. "Only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at all, is it possible, in the field of such entities, to make accessible what is just present-at-hand and no more."

Back to Descartes: He's not a naturalist, and thinks the world and meaning can be explained by positing the extra *res cogitans*.

'Substance' is finally characterized: "By substance we can understand nothing else than an entity which *is* in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to *be*." Descartes' description. Two kinds of substances: *Res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Brute facts and intrinsic intentionality (the latter doesn't need anything external to point outwards). ["But we're already always in a situation."] According to Descartes, the mind gives meaning (function/value-predicates) to the bits of matter. ["Getting 'world' out of these two substances."] Qualities are modifications to the *extensa*.

But when you understand how *holistic* the function might have to be (the hammer makes sense only with respect to a shelter, which needs Dasein to take a stand on itself as a shelterer), the absurdity of treating them as self-sufficient becomes clear. "And if we are to reconstruct this Thing of use, which supposedly comes to us in the first instance 'with its skin off', does not this always require *that we previously take a positive look at the phenomenon whose totality such a reconstruction is to restore?*"

Minsky said that AI died when it had to face up to the problem of common-sense knowledge: This is where his applied Cartesianism hit the referential totality!

The punchline (Heideggerian AI): Get rid of the mental representation and just keep track of the world. (The best model of the world is the world.) Brooke missed the increase in familiarity.

Lecture 9

Dreyfus says coping isn't exactly the right word! It doesn't feel effortless! Maybe we should say "dealing".

Spatiality:

Two kinds of 'in': Inclusion and involvement. Inclusion: The ball is inside the box. Involvement: The kind of 'in' Dasein has.

Existential space (lived space): It has a center ('here'). There can thus be 'closeness'; has 'up' and 'down'. There are *places* in it.

Cartesian space: No center; distance, no 'nearness' and 'farness'. No *places*; all points are homogeneous. Hidden by existential space. ("There is some phenomenal justification for regarding the *extension* as a basic characteristic of the 'world'." Scientific realism!) Never proximally given.

Regions: "This 'whither', which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in our concerned dealings, we call the '*region*'." ["The meaningful dimensions of spatial experience that has to do not with location but with what concern's Dasein."] The workshop is not an example. The house is 'tracking' something physical and relating it to Dasein's project (the way the sun does temporally). Regions are world-space, analogous to world-time.

Even the ready-to-hand wouldn't make sense if it weren't already in a background of familiarity. The latter is that which makes primordial intentionality possible; not itself intentionality.

That describes the spatiality of the ready-to-hand dealing (coping) Dasein. Next, the ontological condition of its possibility.

De-severe/De-distance: ["Heidegger's name for this very familiar concrete capability we have for coming across this as near or far."] The basic capacity to get closer to things? Getting an optimal grip? But that's too psychological; de-distancing is an ontological notion. It refers to this: We *open up* the space in which things can be near and far. It isn't removing distance at all. A signification both active (ontological) and transitive ("what you get out of it...already inside the distance-playing game"). A constitutive state of Dasein's being. "Removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factual mode." It doesn't mean bringing things *nearer*. But...it "amounts to making the farness vanish." Bring it *close*. What? No, says Dreyfus! He messes up! It makes farness show up as a possibility. What Heidegger's saying is too existential, too ontic by half.

"Only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their de-distancedness, do 'remoteness' and distances with regard to other things become accessible to entities within-the-world themselves." That's the right thing to say.

Ontologically, we open up; ontically, we have a tendency to closeness. Hmm, why is Heidegger calling the ontological part of it closeness here, in a reversal? And why does he call it *releasing* existential space?

Moving on.

A problem: How do we get out of the here-now and into the world? Heidegger's answer: There isn't any here-now. For the dealing Dasein, here is tied up with the yonder (holism).

Heidegger's problem: Unlike the shared familiarity, he relates nearness and closeness to the individual Dasein. We're always in the world with a sort of perspective. ["Dasein is being-in-the-world...Dasein is *its* world."] Open heads turned towards the world *from a particular point of view*. (Not in the subjective sense, however.) Each of us has our openness to the world.

This poses the question: What does it mean to be nearer to something (in the existential sense) if it isn't measurable spatial distance?

1. Accessibility/accessibility (135)
2. Mattering (141)
3. Maximal hold (141: "When one is primarily...")

He doesn't have ways of making sense of the fact that if our body wasn't the way it was, we may not have an up/down, left/right, etc. He mentions the body once and drops it; 143.

Recap: Chapter III

Now, we study the 'world' constituent of 'Being-in-the-world'.

To describe the world as a phenomenon it to see what shows itself in entities within the world.

The four senses of 'world' as elaborated: An ontical totality of entities; an ontological realm of being for entities; an ontical *wherein* for Dasein; an ontologico-existential characteristic description of Dasein itself (worldhood). In general, 'world' will be used to refer to the third sense.

It is the fourth sense which corresponds to the constituent in Dasein's state of 'Being-in-the-world'. Taken in any of the other three ways, we will have a phenomenological description of entities as 'within-the-world' whose way of being is presence-at-hand as our way of approach to the 'world'. This deprives the world of its worldhood.

The way of approach corresponding to the fourth sense is by an analysis of *environment* (entities within-the-*environment*, so to speak), for it is that which is the world of everyday Dasein, which is closest to it. The indicated spatiality is clarified in terms of the structure of worldhood, as opposed to Descartes, who clarified the world with spatiality.

Calling these entities within-the-world (specifically, within the environment) 'Things' leads us ontologically astray, even though ontically we have something else in mind. What about 'Things invested with value'? We let this notion of investing with value fade into obscurity and call them *equipment*.

The defining characteristic of equipment is that there is no such thing as 'an' equipment; it always shows up in a totality, holistic; this totality is discovered even before any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. In the structure of this totality is contained a manifold of *assignments*.

Suitability, appropriateness and norm in combination lead to the manipulability of equipment.

Having moved away from the present-at-hand Thing, we call the kind of Being which equipment has *readiness-to-hand*. Scrutiny by the theoretical eye is replaced by *circumspection* as the object becomes transparent to the former.

Our concern is not the tools themselves, but that *towards-which* they are oriented—the work, which bears with it the referential totality. And through the equipment that is used, Nature is *discovered* (as that which produces them)—but not in its presence-at-hand. In this way, we discover entities within-the-world. And through the work which it produces, we also *encounter* Dasein's kind of being (as that for which it has an assignment).

(Heidegger says that any entity *without* the character of Dasein possesses *discoveredness*.)

But it seems as if it is only because there is something present-at-hand first, is there anything that is ready-to-hand. However, this does not mean the latter is founded on the former; its own primordially must be demonstrated, along with the movement from these entities within-the-world to the phenomenon of the world in general.

The world itself is not an entity, but only insofar as “there is” a world can we encounter entities. This encountering gives us a pre-phenomenological glimpse of the phenomenon of the world.

The worldly character of entities within-the-world can come to the fore in the following ways:

1. Conspicuousness: A broken tool.
2. Obtrusiveness: A missing tool.
3. Obstinacy: An unnecessary tool.

In all three cases, pure presence-at-hand is now able to announce itself. Thus, it is clear that readiness-to-hand cannot be said to be founded on presence-at-hand.

When one of these three events occurs, the assignment the equipment was bound up with becomes disturbed or broken, and so, becomes explicit. By becoming explicit, the context of equipment, the totality sighted circumspectively beforehand and *disclosed* beforehand, is *lit up*. (The worldhood of those entities is lit up.) With this, the world “announces itself”. And the world must not announce itself if the ready-to-hand is to remain inconspicuous etc.

There is another way, apart from disturbance, in which the phenomenon of the world announces itself. *Signs* are a specific type of equipment whose serviceability consists in making us aware of the referential totality by *indicating* it. This indicating (which makes the “towards-which” of serviceability concrete) is a specific kind of *referring*—we saw earlier how equipment always refers to other equipment; here, the sign refers to the whole. The former is an ontological attribute of equipment (reference of serviceability), while the latter makes the assignment ontically concrete (reference of indicating). They need to come together—equipment must refer to both the assignment and to other equipment—in order for a definite kind of equipment to “become possible”.

(Another example of reference is usability—“for-which”.)

A relation is a formalized reference, and it has its ontological source in reference (further proof that presence-at-hand does not underlie readiness-to-hand).

How does the sign indicate? A sign either ‘gives way’ or prompts Dasein to ‘stand still’; the latter is a limiting case of the directional on-its-way that belongs to Dasein essentially. We establish a sign such that it remains ready-to-hand even as it lets something else become conspicuous.

A sign is not to be taken as a Thing present-at-hand before it becomes a sign; it may just be equipment which has not yet been understood.

Some weird talk about how the sign coincides with that which is indicated for 'primitive' Dasein. (For example, the voodoo doll *is* the person it signifies.) Because of the lack of objectification, the sign is no longer portable, and that the 'immediacy' of primitive Dasein's Being-in-the-world means that ready-to-hand equipment doesn't have the same hermeneutic function as it does for 'civilized' Dasein. Given Heidegger's political proclivities it's probably best to ignore this bit; he says anyway that we are working out the *formal* idea of worldhood, which can then be applied to whatever kind of Dasein. (The categories of presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand and existence are not wholly ontological in such a way that they will apply to any hermeneutic.)

All this talk makes the ontological presupposition of the *assignment*.

Now, the world is that which *lets* the ready-to-hand be encountered (in terms of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand), and when we encounter it within-the-world, it is *freed* for circumspection. When it is freed for its Being, its Being is *involvement*; this is an *ontological* definitive. But for any entity to show itself to concern, it must already be something ready-to-hand environmentally, and not a Thing to be picked up. An involvement is only discovered on the basis of a prior discovery of a totality. These involvements bottom out with a "for-the-sake-of-which", which pertains to the Being of Dasein.

But what is that on the basis of which the world lets the ready-to-hand be encountered—that already-disclosedness? It is the pre-ontological understanding of the world that Dasein as an entity always comports itself towards.

"The 'wherein' of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that on the basis of which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the world. This familiarity is constitutive for Dasein."

Significance is a structural element of the world, an ontical condition which makes it possible for Dasein to discover the totality of involvements; an *existential* state. In turn, this significance itself must be something Dasein has a familiarity with at an ontological level. *Significance* and *familiarity* seem to basically be the two kinds of for-the-sake-of-which that Dreyfus was struggling with.

The hermeneutic of the world and worldhood is now paused to criticize the Cartesian theory.

Substance was confusedly held to be both the Being of the entity (substantiality) and the entity itself (substance). This substantiality was, for *res corporea*, identified with *extensio*; *extensio* was thus ontologically constitutive for the world.

The only *authentic* substance is that entities whose Being needs nothing else; the only such entity is God. But relative to the world of man, there are two such entities: The *ego cogito* and the *res corporea*.

But if there is such an "infinite difference" between God and the world, how can we say both "God is" and "The world is"? Descartes evades this question; he fails to discuss the meaning of Being associated with his idea of substantiality; indeed, it "gets passed off as something incapable of clarification". Substance itself continues with its dual ontic and ontological signification; we must track down the equivocation.

The Cartesian way of approach to ontology was by the *intellectio*, mathematics and physics; the senses were capable of telling us nothing about the Being of entities. But just because sensation can mislead does not mean that it has no Being at all, and does not exist as an entity at all (which is what Descartes does, by taking it all to be something present-at-hand).

Nor is it true that this ontology sets the foundation for things like beauty and utility to emerge; this rounding-out with value of things present-at-hand fails to account for their *intelligibility*.

But, continues Heidegger, there is still some wisdom in regarding the *extensio* to be a constituting characteristic of the world (in the first sense—the totality of entities).

To begin with, ready-to-hand equipment always have a *closeness*. Furthermore, a *region* is a meaningful dimension of spatial experience—that has to do not with location but with what concerns Dasein—to which the totality of *places* (each equipment has its place) for a context of equipment gets allotted; it must be discovered beforehand for equipment to subsequently take its place. Again, it is not true that regions are formed first by present-at-hand Things; the readiness-to-hand of a region itself has a “character of inconspicuous familiarity”. This last remark leads us to the notion that Dasein itself must be ‘spatial’ with regard to its Being-in-the-world.

Dasein is essentially de-severant. De-severance is an ontological condition; ontically, it translates to an essential tendency to closeness. Closeness and remoteness are accessible only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their de-severedness; de-severedness thus reveals the Being-in-itself of the ‘true world’ which Dasein exists alongside.

“Occupying a place must be conceived as a de-severing of the environmentally ready-to-hand into a region which has been circumspectively discovered in advance.” But here Heidegger’s own ontic/ontological confusion with respect to de-severance comes forth. How can public spatiality be grounded in individual Dasein’s concerns? De-severance should have been written as an ontological opening up in the *public* world, to begin with, and the change/crossing over effected between Dasein and equipment should be relegated to another distinct the ontic realm of things. Perhaps we should have had Significance : Familiarity : : Directionality : De-severance. (“The significance with which Dasein is familiar”/ “What is ready-to-hand within-the-world is de-severed and given directionality”).

“Because Dasein is spatial in the way we have described, space shows itself as *a priori*.”

How does physical space emerge from this existential space? By thematization, of course; and this deprives the worldly character of the ready-to-hand of its worldhood.

But we have yet to clarify the Being of space and the way in which it is constitutive for the world. This is akin to the question of the Being of familiarity and the way in which it is constitutive, and Heidegger thus rightly says that “the problematic...must be turned in such a direction as to clarify the possibilities of Being in general.”

Lecture 10

In the disclosedness of the existential space closest to us, Cartesian space remains “hidden” (but we shouldn’t see *causally* underlies—no causation can connect natural kinds to intelligibility).

Heidegger is not an idealist—therefore, he doesn’t have to explain physical distance in terms of lived-in space or anything like that— [“Distance is really there”.] Dreyfus reiterates his belief that Heidegger is a scientific realist. [“You can’t explain nearness and remoteness *without* distance, either.”]

“The spatiality of what we proximally encounter in circumspection can become a theme for circumspection itself, as well as a task for calculation and measurement, as in building and surveying.” Not quite a breakdown. And now: “The space which thus shows itself can be studied

purely by looking at it, if one gives up what was formerly the only possibility of access to it—circumspective calculation.” Existential space turns to Cartesian space.

In 413, Heidegger talks about considering a hammer as present-at-hand as *releasing* it: So similar to *freeing*, and yet associated with pretty much exactly the opposite thing.

When you can no longer use stuff to take a stand on your own being, the referential totality looks like broken pieces of equipment.

You’re not freeing the chalk *from* anything—you’re making it available. In the sense of: “Is this seat free?”

Descartes got it wrong about *us*—but not about objects; the *res extensa* is still a deep insight.

Four attacks on the self-sufficient ego/cogito (an attack on the ego as a container of intentional content):

1. A more primordial intentionality (which still has goals/conditions of satisfaction)
2. Coping/dealing; our holistic background of familiarity with the world; goalless; condition of possibility for both other kinds of intentionality
3. The self and the world are inter-defined (After getting rid of the subject, getting rid of the self)
4. Individual Dasein is not the source of intelligibility.

Husserl’s mistake: Holding that a subject unifies its stream of experience; the ‘who’ maintains itself identical through them. The subject is a substance which underlies the mental states.

Innerness affords a phenomenological problematic of its own, but it’s derivative; Heidegger doesn’t *deny* private mental states. (A claim Heidegger makes: Dasein has a tendency to treat itself as a substance. But we didn’t always talk about ourselves in terms of an inner, Dreyfus says.) This givenness of the “I” to Dasein may well lead our existential analytic into a pitfall. It’s only a *formal indicator*: We don’t know what it is yet; we can only start with what we think it is.

Let’s go back to the phenomena!

Lecture 11

The problem of other minds must be dissolved: An epistemological problem which arises because of the metaphysical subject-object schema.

Dasein-with: An *existentiell* factual situation. Being-with: An *existential* structure. [“When we see anything, we always see it as what anybody could see. Dasein-with doesn’t capture that.”] Being-with is essentially associated with Dasein even when factually no Other is perceived.

“Even one’s own Dasein becomes something that it can proximally ‘come across’ only when it looks away from [inner] ‘experiences’ and the ‘center of its acts’ or does not yet ‘see’ them at all.” Dasein isn’t essentially reflection. “Dasein find ‘itself’ proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids—in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned.”

But there *is* a sense in which people are alienated from each other, isn’t there? For one, this isolation can only happen on a *background* of shared stuff. Privative modes and hidden motives are deficient modes (breakdown cases) and give rise to a problem of *another* mind.

Dasein's mode of relating to things is *care*. Caring about things is *concern*. Caring about people is *solicitude*.

"Because solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least the indifferent modes, the kind of knowing-oneself which is essential and closest, demands that one become acquainted with oneself." Dreyfus seems clueless, but maybe this just means: We wish to know ourselves because we seem to always be unable to know others.

Anyway, the bottom line is: You can't be a 'romantic' and start with introspection to find out your true self and *then* go into the public world. You subtract stuff from the shared phenomenon to get the inner residue.

"Only on the basis of Being-with does empathy become possible."

Question: What's the source of the meaning in the world? In Descartes, it's us putting values on things. Heidegger answers this *and* the question of who Dasein is in one stroke.

["The 'one' is the phrase that expresses how the norms are."] The answer to both questions is the 'one' (das Man). We walk, talk, enjoy, judge, etc. the way *one* walks, talks, etc., and these norms take us over (we conform to their 'dictatorship'—then again, it's very helpful). You can't be Dasein without their being the 'one'. "The 'one' articulates the referential context of significance."

"Man's '*substance*' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather *existence*." Pure Kierkegaard, it seems.

Lecture 12

Two ways to consider *das Man*: The negative one from Kierkegaard, conforming to the norms; the positive one related to Wittgenstein, the shared practices forming the basis of intelligibility.

"One is what one does."

The neutral description: The 'one' is again for us one of those sly things which is nearest and farthest from us; water to the fish. This kind of being which belongs to being-with is called *distantiality*. ["The inconspicuous pressure to conform to the norms."] Not a kind of intentionality.

The negative description: "This averageness...keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority (superiority?) gets noiselessly suppressed." And so on. This leads to the "levelling" of all possibilities of being. "Distantiality, averageness, and levelling as ways of Being for the 'one', constitute what we know as 'publicness'." Publicness is always right, not because it has deeper insight but because it is insensitive.

(In Division Two, Heidegger talks about a higher intelligibility which goes against everyday intelligibility, which corresponds to *mastery*; authentic Dasein, which does the uniquely appropriate thing. However, there isn't any higher *source* of intelligibility than das Man. Heidegger's 'interesting problem': How do you stay in the 'one' and still reach up to a higher level of intelligibility?)

Heidegger partly thinks of logos as *gathering*: Our practices have a tendency to become richer. (Derrida says the opposite: Practices *disseminate*. For Foucault: *Problematization*.) None of these practices have any *grounding*. But this doesn't mean you're facing an abyss; rather, you have the *unground*.

What is the kind of Being das Man has? It doesn't fit into any of the previous three categories. No worries: Stick to the phenomena!

Two *existentiell*, two ways in which an individual can relate to the *existentiale* of das Man: One can do what 'one' does and be a conformist, living in levelling; or you could become an authentic master.

Recap: Chapter IV

To understand the Being of Dasein, the following question is to be investigated: Who is Dasein? This is related to the *mineness* of Dasein, one of the two constituents of its Being as told in chapter I.

The answer that the "who" is "I" is *ontically* obvious, but ontologically, the answer remains to be clarified; the "who" of everyday Dasein is patently not present-at-hand, unlike this "I".

"Dasein is in each case mine...and this [is] the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is not itself."

The indubitable givenness of the "I" corresponds to a formal, reflective awareness. The phenomenological hermeneutic of Dasein makes it clear that proximally and for the most part it isn't an isolated "I" which is given. For this, a better clue than mineness is the *existence* of Dasein.

"Our investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the-world—that basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its Being gets co-determined."

In our ready-to-hand environmental context of equipment, we encounter (and 'free') Others. Their way of Being is not RTH or PAH, but is the same as that of Dasein itself.

But here, 'the Others' does not mean 'everyone else but me'. "They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself." Even one's own Dasein is something encountered.

But this disclosure of the Dasein-with of the Others can happen only because Dasein itself is *essentially* Being-with. And "this phenomenological assertion...does not seek to establish ontically that factually I am not present-at-hand alone. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this."

The way Dasein was said to be *concerned* with equipment, entities composing the Others are objects of *solicitude*, an *existentiale* state. This is the second mode of *care*.

Solicitude has two extremes in its positive modes: *Leaping in* and *leaping ahead*. In the former, the Other is objectified and "de-Daseined". In the latter, the Other remains in its existential Being, the environment is freed for it; the Other becomes transparent to himself in *his* care.

(For your care to be authentic, *you* have to disclose the world. The hill has to be climbed by you.)

The way *circumspection* guides concern to disclose the ready-to-hand in the environment, *considerateness* guides solicitude.

Someone else's psychic life can be ontically understood (empathy) or misunderstood only because it is (pre-)ontologically understood to begin with.

"But the fact that 'empathy' is not a primordial existential phenomenon, any more than is knowing in general, does not mean that there is nothing problematical about it. The special hermeneutic of empathy will have to show how Being-with-one-another and Dasein's knowing of itself are led astray and obstructed by the various possibilities of Being which Dasein itself possesses."

Having established that Dasein is not itself when it is absorbed in the world, the question becomes who it really is.

We first answer the 'who' of the Other: "They are what they do." That the Other engages in *concernful* activity is what is essential to its way of Being (the Being-with).

Now, Dasein's care towards the Other in his Being-with is disturbed due to an ever-present *distantiality*. But in this distantiality, Dasein has to stand in *subjection* to something; and the 'something' it stands in subjection to is *das Man*.

Das Man is the norm. It is what dissolves the "I" into the Other and makes the latter transparent. We do as "one" does. Distantiality is *from* an averageness, and averageness *forces* a levelling-down.

What is essential to Dasein's way of being is that there is always some normative pull. The magnitude and direction of its force may, however, change over the course of history. This pull *disburdens* Dasein by telling it what to do.

Das Man is the "who" of Dasein; it is everybody and nobody. It is not a category to which Dasein belongs; it co-determines the Being of Dasein.

So, the characteristics of Dasein's Being—Being-with, distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, disburdening, etc.—together give rise to the Self (with two possible modes—*existentiell* modifications—authenticity and inauthenticity (the they-Self)), which is thus wholly subsequent.

The pull is what makes the world intelligible (it 'articulates' the referential context of significance).

Lecture 13

Two aspects of Being-in: State-of-mind ("how it's going with you") and understanding.

What the German of state-of-mind actually translates to is (this is misleading on two counts, because it sounds as if you have both physical states and an isolated mind): How you find yourself.

Affectedness. Disposition. Disposedness. A natural example: Mood.

The phenomena that show themselves in our inquiry are *equiprimordial*. "The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of the constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal ground'." For example, present-at-hand and ready-to-hand are equiprimordial. Well, then, what does it mean to say that we're doing "fundamental ontology"?

We've spoken about Dasein's shared world; now, we have to understand its *own* world.

The 'there' (the whole situation— "There I was...") constitutes/makes possible the 'here' and the 'yonder'. "In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness." Dasein has to be its 'there'; it takes a stand on its own being.

Dasein opens up ("clearing") to the world; it *is* this opening up to the world ('illuminated'; turning the light on). "Dasein is its disclosedness." This means: That being which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being is to be Dasein's 'there'.

"The surrounding world is different in a certain way for each of us, and notwithstanding that, we move about in a common world." Thus, Dasein is (essentially) *an* openness to a *shared* world. Again, we dealt with the latter; now for the former.

Moods settle in. They're an atmosphere; the background. If you're grumpy, everything looks irritating. It's impossible to imagine how things would look otherwise. Moods are something you're thrown into. But they aren't psychical conditions (no moods in me; I'm in a mood); they're what

make them possible. Ontologically, moods deliver us over to the 'there'. Thrownness is the *facticity* of Dasein's being delivered over.

NOTE: For Merleau-Ponty, it's your body (inter-corporeality) that attunes you to the mood.

Lecture 14

[“Dasein is always in *the* world by way of *its* situation.”]

The world is intelligible thanks to familiarity and mattering thanks to mood.

The problem: How can the world be gray for you and rosy for me? Surely this means it's *in* us, then, and the world is neutral. (Is this not just the problem Merleau-Ponty works on?) A mood is a complicated situation with a rainbow of colors; you're attuned to and resonate with a particular colour in it (that aspect *matters* to you). The “rich reality” view. The Cartesian intuition is a breakdown case: You can be angry in a manner totally disconnected from the situation, and that would be “inner”. Analogous to unsociable modes of Being-with.

Lecture 15

Two types of understanding: Primary/basic and primordial. (Harken back to the discussion on two different meanings to 'for the sake of'.)

Disposedness ('state-of-mind') is 'equiprimordial' with understanding. Understanding can't make things *matter* (mattering is an attraction, or lack thereof).

The duality of understanding: Dealing with things and coping (basic), taking a stand on one's own existence (primordial). Neither (at their best) require a representation of their goal.

Primordial understanding: Your behavior gets coordinated and organized by the stand you take on yourself (by the possibility-for-Being/ability-to-Be). Potentiality is inappropriate if interpreted in a present-at-hand manner: If you're being on the way to being a *professor* (a present-at-hand property), it's better to get to the actuality; but not so for a *teacher*, because you're always on the way. This is what determines your (way of) skillful coping.

Grief: When we are no longer able to take up (in the primordial sense) the roles we aim towards. Not failure; world-collapse: A significance once lived in is lost.

An interesting question: How can one reconcile the variety of primordial for-the-sake-of-which's that one may take up (for example, being a teacher and being a father?). The role also has to be something which has a cultural meaning.

Understanding is the Being of this ability-to-Be.

“With equal primordially the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world.”

And so, we move onto basic understanding, which 'fills in' the primordial understanding: Not a definite species of cognition. What he's talking about is skillful coping/know-how, with the referential whole in its significance. “He understands how to be a father.”

You can't have one without the other.

“Why does understanding always press into possibilities? Because understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call '*projection*'.” (Note that this doesn't mean having in mind a goal

or a thought-out plan; it includes being *drawn*, say, to open a door, in Merleau-Ponty.) Dasein is thrown into being drawn into: “And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call ‘projecting’. Any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting.”

Lecture 16

How do you get from understanding (pre-conceptual, letting yourself be drawn into the affordances) to interpretation (conceptual, dealing with entities as entities, as substances with properties)? (Merleau-Ponty’s project.)

Heidegger says the ‘as’-structure is a basic feature of the world. This makes it sound like it goes all the way down, and there’s nothing more than what we experience as (showing up as) a table, and a door, etc. This is half-right: It shows up in this way for someone seeing my open a door, but it doesn’t show up in this way at all for my in-flow absorbed act of opening the door.

Understanding is more basic than (the precondition to) interpretation. (Interpretation doesn’t go all the way down: What’s already been understood comes to be interpreted, and you can have uninterpreted understanding.) But also, understanding *becomes itself* in interpretation. The second needs to be explained.

The *explicit coming-to-sight* of an “aspect” of a thing by “circumspective discovery” on the basis of an *understanding* is interpretation. It’s still pre-predicative, not substance with properties (the hammer being too heavy is still something you can say about it in a context, relevant to its use); and so, interpretation lies *between* blindly responding to affordances and predicates. It is an understanding of *something as something*. Interpretation itself doesn’t disclose (that’s the job of understanding), but brings out what is disclosed.

From the History of the Concept of Time: “Interpretation brings to prominence as what the encountered thing can be taken, how it is to be understood. The primary form of all interpretation is the cultivation of understanding; is the consideration of something as the as-what.”

Disposedness gets realized (concrete) as mood; which is to say, mood is the most prominent mode in which we experience in a general way disposedness (and thrownness). Emotions may be another. Understanding gets realized (concrete) as coping/dealing.

[“The as-structure comes in as soon as you respond to the *function* instead of responding to the *solicitation*.”]

Lecture 17

[“In the experience of responding to an affordance, you don’t have an experience of something as something; in a certain way, significance and interpretation are already permeating in the background (*familiarity*).”] At the same time, the as-structure is structuring your experience in the background.

We don’t, unlike what Searle thinks, apply subject-predicates onto brute facts.

Meaning: The most general characteristic of the external world (the referential totality); a characteristic of familiarity. It does not signify the ‘content of judgement’; it is “the existential phenomena already characterized, in which the formal framework of what can be disclosed in understanding and articulated in interpretation becomes visible.”

“Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. Meaning is an *existential* of Dasein.” What we hear is never noises or a multiplicity of tone-data, but sounds with meaning.

[You don't have to learn sounds coming out of people's mouths as meaning something, you just have to learn what specific meaning they have.]

Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation: How we get to logic by leaving out the meaningful world.

Coping -> Contextual noticing -> Decontextually seeing the properties of things -> Theory.

Lecture 18

"Meaning is the on-the-basis-of-which of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception...the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding."

The three "fore—"s: The structure of the phenomenon of everyday dealing.

Fore-having: Familiarity; the whole of primary understanding.

Fore-sight: Circumspection; narrowing to an aspect.

Fore-conception: The assignment; the "for-what" of the thing; where you're placed in the chain of the "in-order-to"s. De-situated aspect.

Intensionality is something invented to do the job of how meaning, etc. corresponds between internal and external, and we can't even explain how it does it. Once again, though, the absence of a developmental story for Dasein's disclosedness comes up.

Formalization is forced to leave off so much of the phenomena that it's impossible to think it can ever get it back from the residue.

Would no amount of evidence make Heidegger an intellectualist? Well, you can't prove that cognitivism is *impossible*, but what Heidegger is doing is telling us a story of all the ways in which it's *implausible*. Heidegger is cautious here: The real phenomenal content *gets* lost (and not *must* get lost); the phenomenal content *resists* mathematical functionalization (and not *can't* be mathematically functionalized).

If our basic way of Being-in-the-world is dealing with familiarity, how is it possible for us to ever get to concepts and judgements? (Or rather, what's involved in it?)

Assertion is a derivative form of interpretation grounded on understanding. It gets you to a point where you can understand properties.

Three functions of assertion:

1. Pointing-out: If you put down a hammer and pick up a lighter one, you could be pointing out that the hammer is too heavy. No 'representation' is involved here. Situated.
2. Predication: The more basic kind—aspects— "too heavy", not "5 pounds". Again, what is put forward the hammer itself and no representation. Predication is founded in and a special case of pointing-out; we make what is manifest *explicitly* manifest by restricting our view and narrowing the (phenomenal) content.
3. Communication: Lets someone see *with* us what we have pointed-out predicatively.

Finally, assertion is defined as a point-out which predicates something (“gives something a definite character”) and communicates. Can only be done on the basis of what has already been disclosed understandingly or discovered circumspectively.

“By what existential-ontological modifications does assertion arise from circumspective interpretation?”

Assertion loosens the predicate “from its unexpressed inclusion in the entity itself”. A Merleau-Ponty example: Loosening out the wooliness from the “wooly red” shade of the carpet.

The fore-sight gets you to the “too heavy”; you need another move to get to “the property of heaviness”.

Lecture 19

[“Predication makes possible the de-contextualization of our understanding.”] A de-situated predicate is a property.

How do we generalize a situational aspect? (From hammer-heavy/too-heavy to heavy.)

If an entity becomes the object of an assertion, there is a *change-over* (from situated to de-situated).

Assertions can be both apophantic and hermeneutic (situated apophantic). “This levelling of the primordial ‘as’ of circumspective interpretation to the ‘as’ with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. The primordial ‘as’ of an interpretation which understands circumspectively we call the *existential-hermeneutical* ‘as’ in distinction from the *apophantical* ‘as’ of the assertion.”

An open question: Is this change-over necessarily dependent on communication, or does communication use the change-over? (Afternote: I think the answer is the first option; communication is always a *part* of this change-over. Even when you’re writing in an empty room, you are communicating, because the shadow of the reader makes manifest the Other.)

Note: The change-over from understanding to assertion seems to mirror that of the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand. (Do they happen under the same conditions? What other conditions could cause a change-over?)

Examples of intermediate cases between situated and de-situated (not disturbances or breakdowns, as such): Assertions about happenings in the environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, reports on the situation, etc.

Discourse and language: “The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse [*Rede*].”

A note on articulation: A skeleton can be articulated in Halloween by a costume (primordial). The articulated skeleton can be further articulated by giving it a name. *Rede* refers to both these levels of articulation.

The Being of words and language (naming) is founded on significations (articulating the skeleton); the disclosure of significations is founded on significance (the totality-of-significations).

“The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world expresses itself as discourse. To significations, words accrue.” Anything named has to first be seen as one node in a network.

Lecture 20

Condition of possibility = Primordial. Primordial talk carves up the world into affordances, solicitations, etc.

In discourse, ["Dasein is disclosed as a disclosure of the referential totality of significance."]

As we develop a skill, we're able to make better distinctions. A domain is articulated to a further extent. The capacity to see these distinctions is (primordial) talk. It becomes manifest in naming.

"In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared."

Idle talk is discourse which doesn't function to disclose anything. But it isn't *lying*. Like das Man, it seems to have two 'moral' aspects (a neutral and a negative); Dreyfus sees this in the tension between 'gossip' (an *irrelevant* communication) and the 'average intelligibility of the Other'. Example of the 'neutral' kind of talk: The mechanic tells me the carburetor isn't working, and I pass it along, although I don't know what that really means.

Note: Dreyfus says there isn't any direct connection between das Man and idle talk, but it seems (a bit too) plainly clear that there is. Idle talk is constitutive of the way in which Being-in-the-world is disclosed by das Man, and insofar as das Man has a dual aspect, so must idle talk.

Lecture 21

A redo of idle talk.

Three ways of using language: Primordial talk (using it appropriately to reveal things), the positive kind of talk (indispensable), covering-up talk.

Regarding the second: "In the language which is spoken when one expresses oneself, there lies an average intelligibility; and in accordance with this intelligibility the discourse which is communicated can be understood to a considerable extent even if the hearer does not bring himself into such a kind of Being towards what the discourse is about as to have a primordial understanding of it."

But in the third case, when it goes wrong, "It serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world." Idle talk is when the positive kind of talk, with its initial lack of grounds to stand on, becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness. (This closing-off isn't the same as just stopping the conversation.)

The movement from idle talk to ambiguity: Talk shows are examples of the verbal perversion of talk, but it need not be verbal; scribbling=blogs are another example. Ambiguity comes in because, outside of the specialized context, you can't really tell which blog is reliable and which one isn't. (Or just replace blog with reddit post.) In Kierkegaardian terms, the scribblers were the press.

Now, why do people engage in idle talk at all, if it's so bad? Because it satisfies their *curiosity*. Being interested in things which are none of your business: Watching the news is Dreyfus' example here. "When curiosity has become free...it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen but just in order to see. Consequently, it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly... [and is] concerned with the constant possibility of *distraction*."

["Idle talk and curiosity are modes of fleeing."]

We're familiar with the coping kind of absorption in the world. But there's another kind: Absorption in das Man. In *both* these cases, Dasein is *falling* into the world. Furthermore, apart from being an existential, there is also a sense in which falling is an *existentiell* (the latter related to conformism which leads up to authenticity and inauthenticity).

[Positive=Existentiell modification of a basic structure.]

A question: To what extent is Dasein's falling away from itself and into das Man constitutive? A suggested answer: The *tendency* towards this is an *existentiale*.

(Note: Why not give falling two ontological aspects, the way concern and solicitude work for care?)

Recap: Chapter V

Dasein's basic state was posited as Being-in-the-world. Having answered the "who" of Dasein and analyzed the 'world' that occurs in it, the next step is to analyze Being-in as such. We have moved from the world to the who for Dasein in the following manner:

Being-alongside the world: Concern.

Being-with the Other: Solicitude.

Being-one's-Self: Das Man.

Being-in is primordial but yet constituted.

Dasein is always in a "situation". Da-Sein: Being-There. What is the fundamental 'there' of this being? Dasein itself: Dasein opens up (*lumen naturale*) to a 'there', and *is* its own 'there'. The 'there' is what the light of this essential disclosedness shines upon; the 'there' is what makes possible ready-to-hand and (present-at-hand) location. Dasein's existential spatiality is constituted by (and yet equiprimordial with?) the 'there'. This "sight" is what gives Dasein access to entities and Being.

We shall analyze the existential constitution of this 'sight', given by the disclosure of the 'there', and the everyday Being of the 'there' (which are existential modes of the same). The former is characterized by *disposedness* and *understanding*; the latter, by *idle talk*, *curiosity* and *ambiguity*. In the end, we shall 'derive' fallenness as constitutive of the Being of the 'there' of this being.

Disposedness (state-of-mind) is an *existentiale*, with which we are acquainted ontically via *moods*.

What about the ontology of moods?

The primordial disclosure of moods consists in their making manifest 'how one is', which in turn brings Dasein before its own 'there' (and so also—since Dasein is its 'there'—its own Being (even though, *ontically*, Dasein may evade that which is disclosed in the mood)).

This deliverance of Dasein over to itself is what is known as *thrownness*. Dasein 'finds itself' in a situation, in the mood that it has. And what is disclosed in a mood is not something 'known' or 'believed'. (We can, using our cognition, control our moods, but this shouldn't confuse us into thinking that mood *isn't* ontologically primordial and prior to cognition. "We are never free of moods.")

Dasein is evasive for the most part towards the disclosure by mood of itself in its thrownness. (This is what will lead up to falling.)

Bad moods are, Heidegger says, ontically misleading and blind Dasein.

So, to sum up: Moods disclose Dasein in its thrownness, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and the world in its mattering-ness. (With reference to the third: An object can be threatening only when our mood is one of fear.) We will see later that understanding discloses Dasein in the capabilities of its Being.

Even science must be *ontologically* precluded by a certain mood, but this is not the same as *ontically* surrendering it to 'feeling'.

Fear is an example of a mood. It has three aspects.

1. What we're afraid of: It could have any of the three major ways of being, and has *detrimentality* as its kind of involvement. This detrimentality has a definite range and a definite origin region. However, there is something *queer* about that which radiates out and is close by—but stays beyond striking distance, so that it may or may not reach us—from this region; this is what makes it *threatening*.
2. Fearing as such: That which is threatening is discovered beforehand in its fearsomeness, and thereby freed and allowed to matter to us.
3. What we're afraid for: Dasein, which is disclosed as *endangered*. As a mood, fear reveals Dasein to itself in the Being of its 'there'.

When that which threatens bursts upon fallen Dasein suddenly, fear becomes *alarm*. When that which threatens is altogether unfamiliar, fear becomes *dread*. When these are combined, we have *terror*. These are all modifications of fear, based on the fact that fearfulness is not an ontical, individual disposition but an ontologico-existential possibility of Dasein's disposedness.

That's that for disposedness: We move on to understanding. Disposedness always has an understanding, and understanding always has a mood.

The primordial disclosure of moods consists in their making manifest 'what/who one is'. Understanding discloses Being-in-the-world as a whole in Dasein's "for-the-sake-of-which": The stand on itself Dasein takes, the role in which it sees itself, which co-determines its actions. These roles are an ability-to-Be towards itself, a kind of Being belonging essentially to Dasein and lying existentially in understanding. A 'role' is a way of solicitude for Others and concern with the world.

Here, 'possibility' is not a modal category of presence-at-hand, nor a deficient mode of 'actual' being, nor something Dasein indifferently chooses or passes by. It is an *existential*; Dasein always maintains itself in a positive, active state of "thrown [projection onto] possibility": It always 'finds itself' in a 'movement' freeing up entities within-the-world.

My understanding discloses myself as a door-opener to me *in terms of* how I may free the door for its *possibilities* (serviceability, detrimentality, etc.). Dasein can discover something in Nature only if it has disclosed it in its possibilities qua possibilities beforehand; Kant's enquiry into the "conditions of possibility" is based on this fact, but it is something he left presupposed and did not justify.

Understanding is always *projecting* upon possibilities: My stand on myself as a door-opener draws my body upon the door in the appropriate manner and onto the possibility of being a walk-outer.

Or for example, if I haven't eaten for a day and I see an apple on a table, I am understandingly disclosed as a "hungry person" to myself in terms of the possible ways in which I may satiate my hunger (via the apple), and my body is drawn towards the apple (this is the projection) in the same pre-perceptual way in which I always find my hand already on the doorknob, before I even 'know' it, when I walk towards a door with the intention of stepping out.

“Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own ability-to-Be, and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what [it] is capable of.”

Dasein’s understanding of itself can be authentic (arising out of one’s Self) or inauthentic (in terms of its world). Both of these further have *existentiell* modifications of genuineness and ingenuineness.

Understanding disclosure of the ‘there’ is also in terms of possibilities and projections of its Being upon them, and has Dasein’s ability-to-Be as its way of Being. This finally also leads us up to Dasein’s understanding of Being: for it has been taken for granted in this projection upon possibilities.

Understanding can be developed into *interpretation*. It appropriates in a manner contiguous with its way of Being that which it already disclosed, and, so to speak, “becomes itself” by having the possibilities it projected worked-out.

What is the phenomena associated with this working-out?

The assigning of an as-structure: When my hand is drawn onto the apple, I may, in my circumspection, see it *as* an apple. Slightly more developed than pure, blind dealing with the world, but still pre-predicative. The as-structure is seen in circumspective discovery: For that is when you respond to a *function*, rather than a ‘mere’ *solicitation*.

This articulation of interpretation is possible only if the as-structure is disclosed as something expressible in understanding beforehand; only, it is unexplicit. Indeed, in spite of the fact that it is often ontically unexpressed, the ‘as’ must be constitutive of understanding in this shadowy manner, and more primordial than understanding free of the ‘as’.

It is important to remember that while these structures must not be broken up into pieces, a primordial analytic which reveals their aspects should still be possible.

Along with its constitutive ‘as’-structure, interpretation is grounded in a ‘fore’-structure of understanding.

- i) Fore-having: The ‘Gestalt’ that Dasein is engaged in.
- ii) Fore-sight: The “in-order-to” that justifies engagement with the Gestalt.
- iii) Fore-conception/grasping: The unexpressed possibility for thematization of entities in the Gestalt which is disclosed primordially.

From the Cambridge lexicon:

‘Heidegger uses the term “fore-structure of understanding” to capture this prior situatedness, and he analyzes it into three interrelated moments: the “forehaving” (Vorhabe) which is our holistic understanding of the pre-given context from out of which we interpret; the “fore-sight” (Vorsicht) which is the particular interests or concerns from the perspective of which we interpret; and the “fore-conception” (Vorgriff) which is the particular language and concepts by which our interpretation is framed and expressed.’

“The character of the possibility corresponds...with the kind of being of the entity which is understood.”

We call *meaning* the *existentiale* by which the *intelligibility* of an entity is maintained. (Thus, the question of the meaning of Being associates with that of its intelligibility.) Projection takes place *on the basis of* meaning. Entities become meaningful when Dasein discovers them understandingly. Meaning is an aspect of *familiarity*, the most general characteristic of the world.

The hermeneutic circle: We can interpret understanding only in terms of the fore-structure (the whole refers to the parts); at the same time, the fore-structure can be interpreted only if one discloses it understandingly beforehand (the parts refer to the whole).

But this is no accident; the circle of understanding and 'impurity' of interpretation is an essential aspect of Dasein's existential constitution. Sciences which reject such circularly constituted activities are merely operating on certain modifications of those existential foundations. "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way."

But from interpretation, a further development can take place: A modification of the 'as' structure, by way of *assertion*. This derivative mode of interpretation holds more importance because it was what ancient ontology took to be the 'locus of truth'.

Heidegger gives three significations to the term 'assertion'.

1. Pointing-out: The situated indication of an equipment's aspect; aboutness.
2. Predication: The de-situated, restricted, narrowing-down of an equipment's aspect; making it explicit, giving it a definite character. A limiting case of pointing-out.
3. Communication: Letting the Other see the object with us by predicating it. What is 'actually' shared is not this object, but our *Being towards* the object.

Thus, assertion is that which communicates by predication on the basis of a pointing-out.

Now, why is this a mode of interpretation at all, and what exactly is the modification interpretation undergoes in it?

To answer the first question: This is because, like any interpretation, assertion has a fore-having (in order to indicate an aspect situatedly, you need to be in a situation to begin with), a fore-sight (the way in which an aspect gets predicated—'loosened out'—is directed by the *why* behind our engagement in the situation), and a fore-conception (the possibility of the articulation in communication must be disclosed and conceived primordially).

To answer the second question: The whole which we are engaged in breaks apart as a certain change-over takes place (fore-having); the directionality of our engagement shifts from readiness-to-hand, which gets covered up for presence-at-hand (fore-sight). The 'as'-structure which reached out into a totality of involvements gets levelled down into the 'mere' structure of properties (from the existential-hermeneutical to the apophantical).

One can potentially make *four* categories here.

1. Existential hermeneutic: The apple is a solicitation in a situation.
2. *Existential* hermeneutic: The apple is seen 'as' an apple but maintains equipmentality in a totality.
3. Existential apophantic: Senseless.
4. *Existential* apophantic: The apple is predicated with a definite character; the totality is broken up.

A note on ancient ontology: Assertions were the 'locus of truth' because they were taken to show things insofar as they were things; they were fundamentally apophantic, and could mislead only as a possibility upon a foundationally revelatory nature.

Between interpretation as concerned understanding and interpretation as theoretical assertion lie many intermediaries.

Heidegger now puts forward a phenomenon which, he says, we had been making constant use of in our analysis of disposedness and understanding, but which was kept suppressed: *Language*.

Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility, and the existential-ontological foundation (the condition of the possibility) of language, and gets expressed in language—which, in turn, is something encountered ready-to-hand within-the-world. Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with disposedness and understanding. (And as said before, that which *can be* articulated by discourse—that wherein the intelligibility of a thing maintains itself—is called ‘meaning’. That which *is* articulated is the Gestalt.) We do not give words significance; to the significances of intelligibilities, words “accrue”.

We have thus differentiated language into three aspects: Existential language, language as use, and language as something open for inspection. They also show up in this order: Language inspected comes after language is in use, which in turn presupposes the disclosiveness of discourse.

Discourse is existentially constituted by:

1. What the discourse is about
2. What is said-in-the-discourse as-such
3. Communication: Just before, communication in assertion was characterized as the sharing of our Being-towards an object with a definite characteristic. Let us now generalize this:
Communication is the articulation of [the intelligibility of] Being-with-one-another which establishes a co-disposedness (1) and an understanding of Being-with (2) (by sharing it ‘explicitly’).
4. Making-known

These may not always receive verbal expression; this is merely indicative of a certain type of discourse. There seems to be no exposition on the three unelaborated aspects.

On the other side of talking (discourse) is hearing; hearing is an existential possibility constitutive of discourse, and is an authentic way in which Dasein is open to its own possibilities (“as in hearing the voice of the friend every Dasein carries with it”). We do not hear pure noise or a multiplicity of tone-data; what we hear is always, first and foremost, a meaningful part of a situation.

Another existential possibility of discourse is silence: “To be able to keep silent, [one] must have something to say.”

By being constitutive for disposedness and understanding, discourse is constitutive for the Being of the ‘there’. The Greeks had some notion of this; thus, the definition of man as “rational animal”. It is not that only man can speak; rather, only Dasein discovers the world (and itself) in discourse.

Heidegger ends the section with an open question: What is the [way of] being of language?

Having described how Dasein discloses the ‘there’ (and so, equivalently, the existential constitution of the ‘there’), we now discuss an existential mode of the same: Everydayness.

(Question: If Dasein discloses *y* via the *existential* *x*, does it always mean that *y* is existentially constituted by *x*? I think yes. In this case, understanding and disposedness spell out what it is for something to *be* the ‘there’: By constituting it, they articulate the identity-conditions for the ‘there’.)

Idle talk is a 'positive phenomenon' which constitutes the kind of being everyday Dasein's understanding has; it is the kind of being which belongs to Being-with-one-another.

To begin characterizing it, one must note that while discourse can lead someone else to a primordial understanding of what it was about, for the most part, it only communicates an average intelligibility. This average intelligibility of the communication gets aggravated to a complete groundlessness by 'publicness' (the premise of the game Chinese Whispers); this 'passing the word along' is what is known as idle talk. One may think of it partially as a necessary evil.

This 'fake' understanding which in turn induces a closing-off is not, by any means, the same as a conscious lie. This existential 'uprooting' of understanding is how Dasein maintains itself for the most part.

Curiosity is a 'tendency-of-Being' which belongs to everydayness (namely, the tendency to see). It is a perverted version of the basic state of sight which belongs to Dasein, for its motive lies not in understanding but in distraction. 'Not tarrying', 'distraction' and 'never dwelling anywhere' are constitutive items for curiosity.

"Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves with the guarantee of a 'life' which, supposedly, is genuinely 'lively'."

This brings us to the third phenomenon characterizing the everydayness of Dasein's disclosure of the 'there': Ambiguity (between a genuine understanding etc. and a superficial one). Ambiguity is "already implied" in thrown Being-with-one-another in a world.

Falling is the kind of Being which belongs to the 'interconnection' (everydayness itself?) between these phenomena.

Dasein falls away from itself and into the world; fallenness means absorption. (Here, Dreyfus distinguished between an ontological and an ontic version: Falling into the world, and falling into the "they"—respectively.) The ontological version is what was hinted at earlier by the reference to Dasein's evasiveness towards the disclosure of its own thrownness; the rest of the chapter looks to be about this.

The fallenness towards publicness is not falling *away* from some ontologically purer status; it is itself an existential characteristic/mode of Dasein/Being-in-the-world. Inauthenticity and authenticity are only distinctive kinds of Being-in-the-world. This is no ontic assertion about the corruption of human nature.

Here are some further constituents of Being-in-the-world, given by falling.

1. Tempting: The essence of publicness (as constitutive of existence), in the mode of idle talk, etc., lies in always pulling us into groundlessness. Herein lies a constant *temptation* towards falling.
2. Tranquilizing: The superficial sense of understanding that the "they" always gives us is what makes falling Being-in-the-world *tranquilizing* (which, in turn, aggravates falling).
3. Alienating: Since the above phenomena obscure Dasein's ability-to-Be from itself and inhibits its own self-understanding, falling Being-in-the-world is also *alienating*.
4. Entangling: But one must understand that this alienation is an *existentiale*. Dasein is factuality-wise driven into feverish attempts at self-dissection, and thereby forced into its own inauthenticity. This is what is meant by Dasein's getting *entangled* in itself.

The constant tearing away of genuine understanding in the downward plunge that is falling is called *turbulence*.

Lecture 22

“The Being of that disclosedness [which belongs essentially to Dasein] is constituted by disposedness, understanding and discourse.” A similar threefold in page 400, but discourse gets replaced by falling and promoted into all three.

[“Dasein’s average everydayness can be defined as Being-in-the-world which is falling, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost possibility-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others.”] Another threefold structure: Now we have to show how they ‘hang together’ systematically.

Another three-fold at the bottom of 235: “The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity [Dasein] are existentiality, facticity, and fallenness.”

Why are these things coming in threes? Because temporality, which is in Heidegger’s intuition, comes in threes: Future, past and present.

Being-ahead-of-itself: Something bound up with the future. A role organizing everything you do. *Thrownness* (facticity) is the ‘past’ version of this. Putting them together, Heidegger gets: “Being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world.” And *absorbed coping* (dealing with entities within-the-world) (falling) is the ‘present’ version of this.

“The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world as Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world. This Being fills in the signification of the term *care*, which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner.”

All factual attitudes—theoretical, practical, etc.—are possibilities of being for the entity which has care as its being. Care is existentially *a priori*, and lies ‘before’ and ‘in’ each of them.

The ‘future’ version possesses the possibility of ‘Being-free’ for authentic *existentiell* possibilities; alternatively, you could ‘abandon’ yourself to the disposal of das Man, becoming inauthentic; alternatively, it could just be *undifferentiated* in you, like for kids, suggests Dreyfus.

The ontological structure of ‘willing’ is mapped onto care.

This seems to lead to a Kantian claim, namely that care is ‘universal’ and ‘necessary’; Dreyfus suggests that Heidegger makes the claim but doesn’t feel he can actually ‘prove’ it ‘transcendentally’, and can only lay it out and tell you why it’s probably right.

Dreyfus says: Care is the meaning of Dasein; Temporality is the meaning of Care; Temporality is the meaning of Being. Recall: “Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. *Meaning is the on-the-basis of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.*” It’s the basis on which something makes sense.

Lecture 23

The problem of the external world:

An important distinction: The world disclosed by Dasein, and the entities discovered by Dasein. These are two separate things.

Heidegger takes an epistemological problem back to an ontological one.

The basic argument: When you have our way of Being-in-the-world, there's no way in which you can doubt the existence of the world. "The world [in the fourth sense] as the "wherein" of Being-in, and the 'world' [here, in the sense of the totality of entities] as entities within-the-world either have been confused or are not distinguished at all. With the *disclosedness* of the world, the 'world' has in each case been *discovered* too." Dasein *is* already outside itself.

Having 'faith' in (Santayana) or 'proving' or 'presupposing' (Searle) the Reality of the external world are all inadequate. "The question...turns out to be an impossible one, not because its consequences lead to inextricable impasses, but because the very entity which serves as its theme, is one which, as it were, repudiates any such formulation of the question."

Heidegger says that Dasein tends to bury the 'world' and formulate this epistemological 'scandal' somehow because of Dasein's falling. Dreyfus doesn't see the sense in this. (Nietzsche would say that this is because it's in our grammar.)

Now, how can we ever be sure that we're really discovered any entities within-the-world? There's a distinction here between coping with things and believing in things. A belief can be false, *but a skillful engagement with things requires that there be the things engaged with*. Football-kicking skills are inseparable from a football. Thereby, Heidegger says: "Along with Dasein as Being-in-the-world, entities within-the-world have in each case already been disclosed." From the History of the Concept of Time: "Nothing in our relationship to the world provides a basis for the phenomenon of belief in the world."

Realism vs idealism:

An ontological question: Is there a universe of stuff independent of us? The affirmative answer to this is robust realism. Dreyfus claims that this is what Heidegger believes. Entities independent of our capabilities of disclosing the world and co-producing it, etc. To an anti-realist, there is no such "pure" present-at-hand.

But apparently, Heidegger believes this only on page 408, and in page 251, he believes in deflationary realism (according to which we have a "natural ontological attitude" in which, say, chairs are treated as 'real'). So, a robust realist about the universe and a deflationary realist about the world.

Lecture 24

Now Dreyfus is claiming that Heidegger is a dogmatic robust realist; he has the equipment to make the argument but doesn't use it.

Why Heidegger looks like a deflationary realist: The world is a co-production by both Dasein and Nature; for example, hammers, which can only be in Dasein's referential whole (and, for the other leg, the causal present-at-hand basis). "All beings depend for their intelligibility on our practices for encountering them...and yet, all beings are independent of our practices for encountering them." The question is how to get this together.

Being depends on us, but entities don't. "Entities *are*, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But Being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs." And later: "Reality is dependent upon care."

A good analogue: The being of money depends on us (we decided to agree and call it money), but the entities—like, the 'dollar bills'—don't depend on us.

Does 'nature' depend on our practices in any way (electrons, the ocean, etc. and not hammers, chairs)? Can it be grasped in itself? Dreyfus cites a couple of lines of Heidegger on relativity which seems to make his answer an unambiguous 'yes'.

So, Dreyfus conclude with: The 'intelligibility' of electrons and laws of motion depends on us; but the measurement results depend on the electron.

We have an epistemological question: How would one know that one is describing electrons as they are 'in themselves'? Once again, asking this question misses the point. Maybe we'll never know for sure. The right question, the interesting one, is the ontological one: ["Can we make sense of the way we encounter things in themselves whose properties are independent of our encountering them?"]

The things of nature are not intelligible as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. However, all the modes of being of entities within-the-world are founded upon the worldhood of the world.

A possible objection is: Even what counts as present-at-hand must be dependent upon practices, must it not? Making sense of things independent of practices is itself a practice. If the intelligibility of everything depends on us, how can we say the entities themselves are absolutely independent of us? One is forced to say that what science deals with isn't even intelligible; and Heidegger seems to bite this bullet!

"The assimilation of understanding and interpretation to a definite ideal of knowledge is not the issue here. Such an ideal itself is only a subspecies of understanding—a subspecies which has strayed into grasping the legitimate present-at-hand in its essential unintelligibility." In some 'funny' sense, electrons are 'incomprehensible'. (**Note: Veiled reality?**) "Explanation is the expository interpretation of the incomprehensible." Not that this exposition would help us 'comprehend' it. ["There is no way of connecting it up with our practices of making sense of things."] So, this seems to gel well with how quantum mechanics seems to be becoming more and more unintelligible.

Alternatively, you can think your access practices capture the structure of what you're dealing with without constituting the same and just say that it is part of the being of nature that it's independent of our practices.

Something I don't understand in the midst of all this: How can something have a way of being (presence-at-hand) and yet be unintelligible?

Dreyfus talks about how you have to have the 'right' fore-having in order to do a science (to grasp the entity in their essential unintelligibility?).

Lecture 25

Truth:

The correspondence (or agreement of representations/propositions/assertions with states-of-affairs of the world) theory of truth is grounded on Heidegger's 'primordial' theory of truth. Agreement is turned into uncovering. (It's not a coherence theory either: "Neither is it an agreement between 'contents of consciousness' among themselves.")

An assertion which is true uncovers an entity (lets it be seen) as it is in itself. "The Being-true of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering." What's being denied is the claim that this agreement is something "in the mind" connecting to something "outer": How is a relation between the *intellectus* and the *res* possible, when they're not of the same species?

The phenomenological explanation of how assertions work (the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic): “If someone here in the classroom makes the assertion ‘The board is black’ and does so in the immediately given context of a question and an answer, to what are we then directed in interpreting the assertion? Perhaps to the phonetic articulation? Or to the representation which the assertion makes and to which the uttered sounds are signs? No! Rather we are directed to the board itself, here on the wall, in perceiving this board, or rather in making the board present and thinking about it, and in nothing else. We participate in and repeat the making of the assertion. That which gives itself immediately in the assertion is that about which it asserts.” Don’t slip in any middlemen (like a mental representation)! “The meaning of an assertion, then, is to be cashed out in terms of the towards which the speaker and hearer of the assertion are directed through the assertion. The relation between an assertion and the world is thus not a representation but a relation of indication.”

Whether or not the truth is being told—confirmation—depends on how the board as an entity shows itself. “Confirmation signifies the entity’s showing itself in its selfsameness.”

The context-sensitivity of truth: When you say there are 13 chairs in a room, you may mean chairs which aren’t broken (depending on your purpose), or in a box, etc.

Three background qualifications that fix the truth of what you’re talking about:

1. What you’re trying to do with it (to be able to tell how many chairs there are)
2. An epistemological skill (to be able to tell if a picture is crooked)
3. A ‘specific’ skill (having the skill of an *architect* to be able to tell you about the picture, among other options for e.g., a carpenter)

Heidegger calls this background “primordial” truth. But for Heidegger, primordial \Leftrightarrow condition of the possibility. The terminology is misleading; the background familiarity is the condition of the possibility of using assertions to point things out as they are. A better name is *disclosurement* (*unconcealing*). (*Uncovering/Discovering* is, on the other hand, *not* the ontological, but the ontic story.)

“What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called ‘true’ in a still more primordial sense.”

A summary: *Understanding* into the future, *thrownness* from the past, *coping* in the present. If it weren’t for all of this, you couldn’t have any correspondence.

Truth is a relation between an assertion and what it points out. Before Newton, there was no ‘truth’ “involved” in the fact that the world followed his laws (they were neither true nor false); nevertheless, if someone were to utter them, they would still have been ‘true’. “Through Newton the laws became true.” Before Newton, there was no “access” to these entities, and so his laws weren’t ‘true’. A parallel with Kuhn’s paradigms/disciplinary matrix: Newton saw the bob as a pendulum, while Aristotle saw the bob as an object trying to reach its “natural place”. “There is truth [entities are disclosed and discovered] only insofar as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is.” (But since Dasein *does* exist, there is no restriction on the ‘Being-true’ of truths.) Truths can be eternal only insofar as Dasein is eternal.

Lecture 26

There *is* a phenomenon of agreement. How do we preserve it without bringing in any representations? Heidegger may say that: In true assertion, an object is pointed out as being a

certain way, in a “how”; and the object shows itself to be the way the assertion points it out as being. (Truth is a special case of indication.) The agreement is between the entity in its selfsameness and the entity as it gets uncovered. A ‘minimalist’ correspondence. This agreement is not the same as the typically conceived agreement between subject and object.

Just as you don’t need an intermediate to *grab* an object, you don’t need one to make an assertion about an object. You can relate to entities within-the-world like this by being a world-discloser. “Being-true as Being-covering is ontologically possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world.”

Deriving the traditional correspondence on the basis of this more basic phenomenon: “The roots of the truth of assertion reach back to the disclosedness of the understanding.”

Using an assertion to point something out is treating it as ready-to-hand. From this, it becomes present-at-hand, along with the object and their relation; this gives the correspondence theory of truth.

Truth and realism: The way ‘reality’ depends on us but ‘real’ doesn’t, ‘truth’ depends on us but ‘what is true’ doesn’t. The revealing depends on us, but what is revealed doesn’t.

Truth and being: “The being of truth is connected primordially with Dasein. And only because Dasein is as constituted by disclosedness can anything like Being be understood. Being is something which ‘there is’ only insofar as truth is. And truth is only insofar as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially.” Being is the basis of *intelligibility*; truth is the basis of *uncovering/encountering* (the intelligible).

Lecture 27

[“Truth discloses [entities], and then being makes sense of them.”] Meaning is the *formal* (abstract) structure of all of the on-the-basis-of-which/background. Being is the content of this formal structure.

Time for the introduction (at last)!

What is asked about (being): The background (keep your eye on the phenomenon).

Six wrong answers:

Being isn’t a ‘supreme being’. The good in Plato, the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant, the master-monad keeping everything in order in Leibniz: Being turned to ‘Supreme Being’; onto-theological. These tracing-onto-an-origin are all erroneous: “The being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.”

Being isn’t the totality of all entities (this leads to the incoherently-posed fundamental question of metaphysics).

Being isn’t a conceptual structure (like Kant’s categories): “That which determines entities as entities” means, in Dreyfus’ reading, that ‘background’ which lets entities show up as foreground. “[Being is] essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate significations.”

Being isn’t what all entities have in common (“being-ness”): “It has been maintained that being is the most universal concept [Aristotle].” The suggestion: Collies->Dogs->Mammals=>.... ->Material things=>...Being[ness]. But the universality of being transcends the universality of any “genus” (a

property everything has) because of the different ways in which it is used (numbers, animals, etc.). What it got right: Aristotle suggests that 'being' is used *analogically*.

Being isn't indefinable. What it got right: Being is not an entity.

Being isn't self-evident. What it got right: Being is 'nearest' to us, in the appropriate sense. However, it's still hidden 'structurally'. (The lighting in the room.) An average intelligibility which demonstrates unintelligibility; an *a priori* enigma. "Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought." "The question of being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-being which belongs to Dasein itself—the pre-ontological understanding of being."

Dreyfus says: Being isn't intelligibility (if it is, we've discovered a universal genus). (Being is that on the basis of which beings are understood, whereas intelligibility is what beings get when they are understood.) Now, intelligibility isn't a property of *an* entity; it's a holistic property (a periodic table is intelligible *in* a paradigm). Familiarity (not a genus—everything has its own familiarity) is more 'basic' (rooms are familiar, not intelligible). The understanding of being is familiarity (i.e., this is the only phenomenon which seems to fit the bill). But also, you can't have familiarity in a room in which nothing is intelligible.

Being means the being of entities ⇔ The background is always that of some foreground.

["To understand more about being and familiarity, we should switch to think about disclosing and disclosedness."] So, we ask about Dasein.

Lecture 28

An amendment to the previous lecture: Heidegger isn't saying there is none, he just isn't *interested* in whether there's a Supreme Being (since it's still a being).

Dasein thinks of itself and everything else (including being) in terms of the world, thus distorting its knowledge of being.

"Faulty interpretations of Dasein's understanding of being have their own necessity in Dasein's historical existence." The past determines what you can see even when you try to look ahead. Tradition is a leveller (bad); heritage is the good flip side.

Phenomenology:

Formally, phenomena is what "shows itself in itself" (even semblance is phenomena). In phenomenology, the phenomena is that which "for the most part does *not* show itself...but...belongs to what does show itself." (Dreyfus says: The background to the foreground. It's no thing-in-itself, because it's something you *can* access.) The phenomena is essentially hidden; this thing which gets disguised up is none other than the being of entities.

But you can thematize it (this is what phenomenology is). Phenomena is what is seen; logos is letting something be seen by a pointing-out. This is how it comes together. This is why phenomenology and ontology are meant for each other. (The phenomenon of the world gets us to the understanding of being.)

Three modes of covering-up: The way it's structurally hidden (covering-ups which are necessary, rather than accidental); buried over (what happens historically); disguising (fleeing because it unsettles you).

Recap: Chapter VI

Definition (Dasein's average everydayness): Being-in-the-world which is falling [present], disclosed (?), thrown [past], and projecting [future]; for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being-alongside-the-world [concern] and in its Being-with-Others [solicitude].

We need to grasp the Being of Dasein not by "putting these together"—as if it is something present-at-hand— but in a structural whole; in a unity.

Dasein's "sight" was what gave it access to entities and Being. This disclosedness was constituted by disposedness and understanding. What are the distinctive states of the latter pair in which Dasein's own Being may be disclosed to itself?

Heidegger says: The disposedness of anxiety, associated with the mood of uncanniness.

An existentially-ontical manifestation of Dasein's falling is its *fleeing* "in the face of" its authentic self-understanding (of its ability to Be; potentiality for Being itself). But this is only possible when Dasein is brought before itself in an ontologico-existential disclosure to begin with.

The discussion on fear makes it clear that Dasein flees in the face of what it finds fearsome as well. However, what it finds fearsome/threatening is always an entity within-the-world. In the fleeing described above, the entity fled from is the same as the entity fleeing.

"The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible. That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such."

To elaborate on the last line: We're anxious in the face of a "nothingness", a nonentity characterized by a lack of involvement, indeterminateness and nowhere-ness as entities within-the-world withdraw in insignificance; we do not know what we're anxious in the face of, and yet it is still oppressively close.

What we're anxious in the face of is the world itself (which belongs essentially to Dasein's Being): The possibility of entities being in general. The world as world is first disclosed by anxiety (although its worldhood cannot be conceptualized by this mood). "Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world." This individualization makes manifest Dasein's freedom for itself in authenticity, showing inauthenticity as just another mode of being. "That which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-being-in-the-world."

Anxiety discloses "world as world" and Being-in as "individualized, pure and thrown self-understanding". Explication of its self-disclosive function establishes it as a distinctive state-of-mind.

With the associated mood of uncanniness, "Being-in enters the existential 'mode' of not[-being]-at-home [as opposed to the at-home of publicness, which we flee *towards*]". Entities within-the-world are what falling flees towards. Dasein can only "understand" uncanniness by falling, but the at-home of publicness is merely a *mode* of the not-at-home of uncanniness, a 'dimming down' of it. (At the same time, this 'dimming down' itself—falling—and anxiety must be equiprimordial: No falling without anxiety manifesting a fleeing-away, and no anxiety without entities to flee-towards.)

Fear is fallen anxiety (inauthentic). The rarity of the phenomenon of anxiety is now immediately explained by Dasein's self-concealment.

Three things revealed in anxiety (future, past and present respectively):

By projective understanding on the basis of and towards its possibilities of itself, Dasein is always and ontologically "Being-ahead-of-itself". This is its existentiality. This is revealed in anxiety in the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity.

But Dasein exists only factically, for it is always delivered over to itself by 'finding' itself in a situation and mood, because it is always-already thrown into a world. Thus, Dasein is "already-being-in-a-world". This is its facticity. This is revealed in anxiety in Dasein's 'finding itself' in its authenticity.

But Dasein's factual existing must also always be falling into the world, absorbed in its concern and in the They. Thus, Dasein is always "Being-alongside" entities within-the-world. This is its fallenness. This is revealed in anxiety in Dasein's fleeing.

Definition (Care): Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-the-world-as-Being-alongside.

The "itself" here should be read as having been abandoned to the They, even when the possibility-of-being projected is one of authenticity. The range of projective possibilities is levelled down by the They into "what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable".

This closing-off of certain possibilities leads to the phenomenon of *wishing*. Since wishing occurs when Dasein has "fallen forfeit to thrownness" (Being-already-alongside takes priority) and keeps *hankering* after possibilities, it presupposes care.

Willing is also rooted ontologically in the care-structure. In it, "an entity...projected upon its possibility gets seized upon." This necessitates a prior disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which, the disclosedness of something one can be concerned with, and the self-projection of Dasein.

Addiction is when care is bound to put *all* possibilities in service of a singularity.

Urge is when care is made free to "crowd out" all other possibilities and leave one.

"The transcendental 'generality' of the phenomenon of care...[is] broad enough to present a basis on which *every* interpretation of Dasein...must move."

Dasein's falling conflated Being with Reality as entities present-at-hand within-the-world. We must separate out these things and demonstrate that Reality itself is only a way of Being.

What is the kind of Being the transcendence of Reality's in-itself has, and is knowing our way of primary access to it? For the latter: Our access to it is founded ontologically on care; discovery of the Real presupposes disclosure of the world.

"The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of the transcendence of Reality] has yet to be given, but that *such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. To have faith [or] prove [or] presuppose* [the Reality of the external world] presuppose a subject which is...*worldless*. 'Consciousness of Reality' is itself a way of Being-in-the-world."

Dasein's falling perverts an ontological problematic into an epistemological one.

For realism: Entities within-the-world are really present-at-hand.

Against realism: This is not a provable thesis but a disclosive mode.

For idealism: "Being cannot be explained through entities and...Reality is possible only in the understanding of Being."

Against idealism: We cannot trace entities back to a consciousness (with indefinite Being).

So, Reality is just one mode of intelligibility, and need have no particular priority (even Dasein's being cannot be characterized by it). *And yet: "[This] does not signify that only when Dasein exists*

and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself it is." (The factual ownmost of reality?)

And yet, without Dasein, there can be no in-itself, because intelligibility and understanding do not exist in-themselves. "It cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not."

"From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth and being." The 'things themselves', the 'truth itself', compels us to uncover the phenomena and see it as it is in itself, with regard to 'truth'. We need to understand how the phenomenon of truth fits into our project of fundamental ontology.

Two tenets of the traditional conception of truth:

1. Judgement (assertion) is the locus of truth
2. The essence of truth lies in 'agreement' between judgement and object

Examining the second tenet, we ask what else is tacitly presupposed in this correspondence. It implicates truth as a 'relation.' But what is the being of this relation (for not all relations are agreements in the sense of truth), and how is it possible between entities of different species (the being of these entities being equally unclarified)? "How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity [that which is judged about] and something that is Real and present-at-hand [the psychic process of judging]?" There is here the presupposition of a relational totality, and it needs to be parsed out—by returning to the phenomena.

An assertion is not related to a representation but to the thing-itself; and how the assertion behaves with the thing-itself is not as an agreement but as an *uncovering*. "Uncoveredness is confirmed when what is put forward in the assertion shows itself as that very same thing. To say that an assertion *is true* signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself." We have Being-true as Being-uncovering on the basis of/as a way of Being-in-the-world.

We must now investigate the existential-ontological foundations of this uncovering (the primordial phenomenon of truth: the conditions of the possibility of truth; in this sense, truth the locus of assertion, as opposed to vice-versa, because it is what allows for assertions to be true or false), and show how agreement arises from uncovering.

The uncoveredness of entities is grounded on their disclosedness; and insofar as Dasein is discloser *as well as disclosed*, Dasein is 'in' the truth—as well as untruth, as we will see.

The *truth of existence* is the most primordial phenomenon of truth, disclosed authentically in Dasein's projection (potentiality-for-Being).

But with equal ontological significance, Dasein's falling hurls truth into inauthenticity and it into untruth.

"Only insofar as Dasein is disclosed has it also been closed off; only insofar as entities within-the-world have been uncovered...have [they] been covered up."

Now, as for deriving truth as agreement: We have discussed how the apophantical "as" of assertion is grounded on the hermeneutical "as" of interpretation, which in turn is grounded on understanding.

A constituent of Dasein's disclosedness was discourse. So, discourse articulates in a ready-to-hand assertion Dasein's concern (towards entities within-the-world) in concern's uncovering activity; it expresses Dasein as an uncovering Being-towards (comportment?) these entities.

The entity's uncoveredness is preserved in assertion; but to demonstrate the uncovering of the assertion, a present-at-hand relation is conceived, and the assertion and its object become present-at-hand as well, along with truth itself.

Why has the matter been obfuscated in this way for so long? Because it lay ontically closest: the uncoveredness of uncovering itself is encountered and understood only in terms of entities within-the-world, and entities within-the-world are first understood as present-at-hand.

Having conceived truth as a mode of intelligibility, it becomes clear that before Newton, his laws were neither true nor false; but this merely means that "before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws".

"All truth is relative to Dasein's being", but this doesn't mean that truth is 'left to the subject's discretion'; this would miss the ownmost sense of uncovering, as a kind of Being which (necessarily) *belongs to* Dasein (and not *controlled by* it). Dasein must *presuppose* truth (in the primordial sense) in all its assertions and arguments.

"Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially."

Being & Time: Division Two

Section 45

Uncovering the phenomenon of care is a first step towards interpreting Dasein with regard to its Being. However, this ontological interpretation does not yet possess 'primordially'.

Recall that each interpretation presupposes a fore-structure. This trifold is called the *hermeneutical situation*. Our remaining task is to clarify this situation for the interpretation we performed.

- a) Fore-having: We have to ensure that Dasein's Being has been uncovered in its *wholeness* and its *unity*. This shall be done by analyzing Dasein's Being-towards-Death.
- b) Fore-sight: We have to ensure that our interpretation is guided by Dasein's Being in its *authenticity*. This shall be done by analyzing Dasein's (authentic) potentiality-for-Being.
- c) Fore-conception: The possibility for thematization of Dasein's Being is articulated by temporality, which shall finally make "intelligible" Dasein's Being.

Everydayness alone fails to give us the wholeness because it lies 'between' birth and death, always giving us Dasein as an entity which has the potential to be something but is not yet it. Everydayness also remains undifferentiated with regards to authenticity and inauthenticity.

Lecture 1

New reading order is established.

Formal indication: You start with the wrong, covered-up version, and move towards the right one. For example, Dasein's Being being existence. This is the methodology Heidegger uses to work out the ontological interpretation of Guilt and Death; getting it wrong tells us something right about it.

We start with Guilt. In the German, it *normally* has the connotation of *owing* something, due to some lack of fulfilment; it's not having done something wrong, as such. But this is a covering-up of something else: Ontological guilt. Heidegger says it's when you can't get behind your thrownness. And this isn't really a "bad" thing. ["Every Dasein is equally guilty, and couldn't be anything but guilty."] Dasein never gets clear about its background, its world-history; a whole lot of things it will never be able to take responsibility for. This non-lucidity, murkiness, is a structural part of Dasein. It can play a positive role.

From the Origin of the Work of Art: "Every decision, however, bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision."

What would it look like if you could lucidly justify what you've done? Kierkegaard says: This seems to lead to a regress into groundlessness, because you have to justify the principles you use to justify your acts, and so on.

Another problem: If decisions are entirely autonomous and principle-based, it undermines them as decisions, since your choice could never make any impactful difference and be a choice (Sartre's example of the gambler who one day decides not to gamble).

"Although it has not laid that basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden by Dasein's mood. 'Being-a-basis' means *never* to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This 'not' belongs to the existential meaning of 'thrownness'."

But we want to cover up the "terrifying" fact that we can't know what we're doing and take responsibility for it; this is the anxiety of guilt.

Lecture 2

Resolute action responds to the unique situation, and not to the general situation; it gets you to mastery. But there's something even more radical than mastery: World-disclosing (this is what death and *anticipatory* resoluteness are about).

Three kinds of nullity:

- i) The nullity of ungroundedness (Heideggerian guilt)
- ii) The nullity of choice (Sartrean freedom)
- iii) The nullity of the possibility of having no more possibilities (Heideggerian death)

Each of these has an anxiety to go with it. ["The anxiety of guilt is the anxiety that there are no grounding principles on which one can act. If every time you make a mistake you try to find a rule not to make that mistake again, you'll be stuck at competence. But if you're living in an experience in which rules and standards don't have any grip on you, anxiety happens, and they're all ungrounded—have no force in determining your actions, you're an expert."]

Wanting to have a conscience = Wanting to be open to and experiencing anxiety = Wanting to be open to and experiencing the groundlessness of action at its most masterful.

"The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as disposedness, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence." This authentic disclosedness is called resoluteness.

Aristotle's add-on to Heidegger's resolute Dasein: The *phronimos* does what he does for the sake of the Good. Aristotle has to make a separate category for people who are experts but do what they do for their own good: 'Clever' (virtuoso).

"Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into that Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already taking action." How resolute Dasein acts defines what the Situation is. "Far removed from any present-at-hand mixture of circumstances and accidents which we encounter, the Situation *is* only through resoluteness and in it."

The anxiety of the ungroundedness of the cultural background of which resolute Dasein is a master is an even more radical anxiety, related to anticipatory resoluteness.

Resoluteness is not only mastery, but also certain conditions which enables one to become a master.

Does Dasein tend back to inauthenticity after becoming authentic? Does it always tend to flee from its anxiety, and is falling into the They something gravity-like? Or does it subsequently find peace in its groundlessness?

Conscience is pulling and summoning you (calling you to be authentic/calling from you the appropriate response to the unique situation), but it's not telling you anything specific to do (its silence). Conscience can't use any language to call; one of the things conscience 'tells' you is that you're Guilty: You can't have any narrative that justifies who you are and what you're doing, because the background on which you're acting can't be conceptualized. Heidegger's double-layered anti-conceptualism. A critique of autonomy.

"Heidegger provides the key, seeing that everyday Dasein pre-reflectively projects upon possibilities. But which possibilities? Dasein, as essentially disposed, has already got itself into definite

possibilities. These possibilities polarize our perceptual field.” [“What Dasein does is what matters to it. What matters to it isn’t anything that you can say anything about.”]

The call isn’t to get into the right mood or go from the wrong mood (that’s the thrownness); it’s to face up to the anxiety due to the inexplicability of moods.

Recap: Chapter II

We deal with authenticity/fore-sight first.

Authenticity is an *existentiell* modification of Dasein’s they-self. In its they-self, Dasein is lost to inauthenticity and disburdened from making choices. To go to its authentic self, Dasein must ‘choose to be a choosing entity’ by ‘finding’ itself via the ‘voice of conscience’.

Conscience discloses Dasein’s authentic Being to itself. Disclosedness itself, as a basic state of Dasein, consists of (the correspondent for conscience is given paranthetically):

- i) Disposedness (Uncanniness)
- ii) Understanding (Guilt)
- iii) Falling
- iv) Discourse (Reticent calling)

Conscience’s discourse has the mode of a *call*. In order to understand what conscience is, this is where we start.

It should be noted that what we will do is not simply to apply the general four characteristics of disclosedness onto the special case of conscience. The hermeneutic spiral shows up again: For conscience itself will give us a deeper understanding of the disclosedness of the “there”.

Since Dasein is an understanding Being-with, it knows its own abilities-to-Be by listening to the They and losing itself in that publicness and idle talk. Dasein’s projective self-understanding is based on its thrownness, its thrownness is disclosed by a mood, and its mood is (for the most part) co-determined by the chatter and public interpretations of the They.

To find itself, it has to now hear itself via a new call (that of conscience) diametrically opposed to the kind of hearing associated with the They. There can be no ambiguity or curiosity (discussed in Division One); this call cannot be mediated (and so lost) by the world of Dasein’s concern.

The appeal of conscience is made to the they-self of Dasein. The appeal calls (‘summons’) this self to its authentic Self by pushing the they-self into insignificance; this push unto insignificance is accomplished by its *silence*.

But who does the calling? The caller itself maintains a silence and by nature possesses a certain indefiniteness. It resists worldly articulation. But of course, the caller can be none other than Dasein itself. “The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me.”

We mentioned earlier how Dasein’s mood, which is what delivers itself over to its thrownness, is for the most part co-determined by the They. In fact, Dasein’s mood is one which is *fleeing* from *uncanniness* (described before), closing it off from its own thrownness. Dasein flees from its anxiety (in the face of nothingness) and into the they-self. It is the alien Dasein knee-deep in the mood of uncanniness, indescribable in a ‘worldly’ way, which does the calling onto the Dasein fled into the homely worldliness of the they-self.

And in the silence of its call, nothing remains for Dasein to pass on into the world or see except its own authentic ability-to-Be.

What does it mean to understand this appeal? Phenomenally, it seems to be the experience of guilt (or some such associated). In the everyday sense, guilt is associated with an owing to another and a certain responsibility.

Definition (Being-guilty): Being-the-basis for the lack of something in the Dasein of an Other such that this Being-the-basis determines itself as 'lacking in some way' in terms of that for which it is the basis.

Let us refine this. In the notion of guilt is embedded a negation. However, this cannot be a not-Being-present-at-hand, because existence is not present-at-hand.

Definition (Being-guilty): Being-the-basis of a nullity.

We now see that this does not indicate a lack in the being-the-basis itself, but only in what arises from it. "Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness...on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only "on the basis" of a primordial Being-guilty. Can something like this be exhibited in Dasein's Being?"

Dasein is thrown into its "there". But this thrownness is not something 'behind' Dasein; it is a constant heaviness unto it, its 'that-it-is-and-has-to-be'. It is a burden on its mood, for it is never Dasein itself which lays this basis for itself ("[Dasein] is never existent *before* its basis"); and yet, it has to take it over. Dasein never knows "where it comes from". This lack of power over its own thrownness is a negation which belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness. Dasein is not the basis of its Being: It never has full control over the basis of its existence. Dasein is the Being of its basis: Dasein is necessarily thrown into a basis which it takes up in its existence.

Ontologically, negation should not be understood as a lacking-of-something in comparison to an ideal set up beforehand.

So, to understand this appeal means: To *want* to have a conscience (for one can never 'choose' conscience itself), to be able to *truly* make a mistake (as opposed to the consciencelessness of the they-self) by taking over one's own lack of control, to make possible one's ownmost Being-guilty, and taking over the thrown entity it is ("a calling-forth to that potentiality-for-Being which in each case I as Dasein am already), bringing itself back from its lostness.

Ordinary conscience differs from our existential interpretation of conscience in the following ways:

- i) It is always critical: Conscience in this special sense is not critical, in the sense of not pointing to anything positive; but equally, it is not anything negative, because all it does is "summon Dasein to existence".
- ii) It speaks relative to some definite deed: Limiting our understanding of conscience as always regarding a definite deed makes us miss its fundamental disclosive power and reduces it to a weight-balancer.
- iii) Its voice is never so "radically related" to Dasein's Being: The fact remains that our everyday experience of conscience is nothing like getting summoned to Being-guilty. But this is only because Dasein's self-understanding is distorted by its concerned falling and fleeing.
- iv) Its basic forms come in good and evil: It seems that evil conscience is always heard after the deed, and refers back to it. Now, this call does refer back, but not to the deed; it calls

‘beyond’ it and back to Being-guilty; it calls Dasein to seize upon this, seize forth its thrownness. ‘Good’ conscience is not a conscience-phenomenon at all, for in definitively ‘ascertaining’ that we are not responsible for something, we are moving away from understanding our constant Being-guilty, the eternal vagueness of what we are responsible for.

The mood corresponding with understanding the call is a readiness for anxiety. The mode of discourse is reticence; “the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness”. That they cannot hear this silent mode of discourse speaks to their inability to hear anything but loud idle talk.

Definition (Resoluteness): Reticent self-projection upon one’s Being-guilty in readiness for anxiety.

Earlier, there was talk about how primordial truth is the background which conditions everyday truth. In that case, with resoluteness, the very truth of existence is revealed, the truth of Dasein which is most primordial; for resoluteness is authentic.

Far from isolating it from Others, resoluteness makes Dasein capable of drawing others as well to their ownmost potentiality-for-Being via solicitude.

“Resoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution”. And yet, while it is existentially definite, it is necessarily indefinite *existentially*; it cannot direct us to seize this or that possibility; rather, it is what determines the possibilities.

Definition (Situation): The “there” disclosed in resoluteness.

The lost Dasein can only respond to a general situation, while authentic Dasein always responds to the unique Situation. The call of conscience calls us forth into the Situation: This is its existential positivity. Resoluteness does not first assess and then act on a Situation; “As resolute, Dasein is already taking action.” Resoluteness comes before all practical-theoretical dialectics.

Lecture 3

Once again, we use formal indicators to start with the wrong, covered-up version and move towards the right one. But it’s not just any cover-up: The wrong answer, in some sense, contains the right one.

[“If you’re doing stuff in a way that’s universalizable, that’s a hint that it’s the wrong way to do it.”]

Why is conscience calling you to do all these things? Because of the “unsettledness” of Dasein. Dasein has no “natural” way of acting. This is its ungroundedness.

It’s a (motivated) cover-up to think death has something to do with what happens at the end of your life: This “demise” is indefinitely supposed to be some sort of event ‘in the future’. Authentic death makes you *anxious*; inauthentic death makes you feel *fear* (and shows up as something we can delay, etc. which is reassuring).

Distinct stages in the account:

- i) The everyday, tranquilizing interpretation which applies only to some “one”.
- ii) The existentialist interpretation, in which you have to face up to this event; what matters is the attitude you have towards death, not death itself. This stand is what gives the event meaning.
- iii) The ontological conception, which Heidegger is dealing with.

What does Heidegger mean when he says death is non-relational (308)? Possibly that: nobody else can do it for you. It brings you into your unique situation. But: ["Just because you have to do it alone, doesn't mean all concern for other things fails you. It fails you if you expect any help (they can't get you out of it) but not in any stronger sense."] Don't misread this by thinking you become more authentic as you become more estranged from people.

So, anxiety and death are isolating because nobody can help you get out of them.

Why Heidegger isn't interested in ii): What's interesting is not how you're dwelling on it, but how you're dwelling *in* it, rather. "Death is a way to be which, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. 'As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.'"

Perishing is to be distinguished from death, as the ending of that which lives. Dasein can end without ever *authentically* dying (*dying* being the stand you take towards your death), but never as 'simply' perishing: *Demise* is a stand you take upon your own perishing; or rather, the event of perishing with an interpretation given to it. This is something always taken, and could be something you have even in your das Man.

Perishing (the end of something living) -> Demise (the end with an interpretation) -> Dying (the end with the *right* interpretation).

Death is the "possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all". This thought of the lack of existence causes the anxiety of death. A phrase Dreyfus uses: World-collapse. ["It isn't just that there are no more buffalos to hunt, it means you can't even understand why you'd want to hunt buffalos anymore."] A question: Does world-collapse refer to a collapse of identity/cultural world, or demise? Possibly both, given how abstract Heidegger is. Dreyfus would like to think of the latter as a paradigm case of it (it's not inevitable that science is going to collapse, but death is inevitable).

(Three kinds of anxiety: The anxiety of guilt [ungroundedness], the anxiety of death [inexistence], and the anxiety of choice [not yet discussed].)

What stance should one take towards world-collapse? Anticipatory resoluteness: For you are a being which has to have a world which has to collapse.

Demise isn't some future event because it's not something you can ever experience; you can't ever really imagine what death would be like—this makes it *distinctively* impending.

["Dying is a way of life in the face of the possibility of demise—anticipatory resoluteness is a name for that way of life which accounts for death—; perishing is end of life, and demise is 'terminal' world-collapsing/end of Dasein. Death is the constant possibility of world-collapse."]

We have to be vulnerable to world collapse for it to be possible to understand the end of our life as demise. For non-terminal world-collapses, Dasein still has its mineness and thrownness.

Recap: Chapter I

We must try to arrive at a *complete* description of Dasein, in spite of the fact that the care-structure is essentially incomplete due to Dasein always being ahead-of-itself-being-towards-its-possibilities. "There is always something still outstanding...there is constantly something still to be settled."

And if it so happens that everything outstanding is accounted for, so that there is nothing more to be settled, Dasein loses its Being-in-the-world.

Death is a possibility for making accessible Dasein in its wholeness.

In death, the Being of the “there” is lost to Dasein, along with the possibility of understanding or experiencing the transition. We do, however, understand it “objectively” in the death of Others. How far can we get with this “objective” knowledge?

“The end of the entity qua Dasein is the beginning of the same entity qua something present-at-hand.” But the entity is not now merely a “lifeless material Thing”; it is something *unalive* (its history of life never leaves it).

Furthermore, the deceased is not just an unalive item of equipment (in the way of funeral rites, etc.), but also an entity unto which the remaining ones share their Being-with—even though that entity itself can no longer possess Being-with Other itself.

It becomes clear, then, that a loss is only experienced by those who remain—and this, only a loss of something we are ‘alongside’; the loss-of-Being actually underwent by the dying person remains inaccessible.

“We are asking about the meaning of the dying of the person who dies as a possibility which belongs to his Being...not the way in which the deceased has Dasein-with with those who are left behind. Death as experienced in others...cannot give us what it presumes to give.”

In general, that one Dasein can be represented by another is not only a possibility but even constitutive for our being with one another. However, this cannot be done when what is being represented is Dasein’s death. Nobody else can die for you. Therefore, death, which cannot be experienced in one’s own Dasein, can never truly be made accessible in that of a stranger. Therefore, death is **non-relational**.

Let’s go back to where we started, and instead try to understand the notions of “end” and “totality” better first.

The three major ‘discoveries’ so far in our discussion of death are: Dasein’s incompleteness, the no-longer-Dasein of an entity after death, and death’s irrepresentability.

Dasein’s ‘lack of totality’, the first theme, finds an ‘end’ with death. Here are two *incorrect* characterizations of the “not-yet” behind the lack of totality:

a) Something outstanding in a summative togetherness: The way in which an outstanding debt ought to belong to an entity, and can be liquidated by being paid off so that everything is all ‘together’. But ontologically, that which is outstanding or not yet together with the rest becomes something unready-to-hand, so that the entity itself for which something is outstanding must be ready-to-hand. But Dasein is not ready-to-hand, and its togetherness is not that of ready-to-hand entities being pieced together.

b) Something inaccessible which has yet to become accessible: The way in which a crescent moon turns into a new moon. But the “not-yet” of Dasein is not just something which occasionally happens to be inaccessible to experience: “It ‘is’ not yet ‘actual’ at all”.

The not-yet of the unripe fruit is more akin to that of Dasein. The unripe fruit has to go towards its ripeness of its *own* accord. It is not something which can be pieced onto it; nor can one eliminate the unripeness by any kind of contribution. The “not-yet” of the unripeness is entrenched with the specific kind of Being of the fruit.

However, the ‘end’ signified by ripeness is distinct from the ending signified by death. In ripeness, the fruit ‘fulfills’ itself; while Dasein, says Heidegger, ‘disintegrates’. Nor is this ending merely the

finishedness (say, of a road) which makes fulfillment possible. For Dasein, its end is already a part of its Being in a unique way (the way its “not-yet” is part of its Being). ‘As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.’ Therefore, death is **not to be outstripped**.

The terms perishing (the end of something living), demise (the end with an interpretation), and dying (the end with the *right* interpretation) are defined. The formal ontological analysis of death is separated from ontical, biological and psychological questions about it, which each presuppose the former.

“Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped. As such, death is something which is distinctively impending.”

How do the trifold of Dasein’s existence, facticity and fallenness make themselves visible in the phenomenon of death?

Dasein’s thrownness into death is first revealed in the basic mood of anxiety. This is not to be confused with “fear in the face of one’s demise;” rather, it discloses Dasein’s existence as Being-towards-death. And yet, in falling, Dasein is always fleeing from the uncanniness of this mood.

Can we see a concrete connection between Being-towards-death and care in everydayness?

The they-self flees death by denying its possibility and affirming its actuality as an ‘event’ which may happen to someone *else*. When we say “One dies”, the “one” belongs not to me, but to nobody in particular. It *tempts* Dasein to cover up from itself its ownmost Being-towards-death, and this covering-up *tranquilizes* us. And since the ‘fitting’ response to this fact is deemed to be indifference, Dasein is *alienated* from its ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being.

Via this temptation, tranquilization and alienation, Dasein’s falling with regards to everyday Being-towards-death becomes a fleeing/evasion in the face of death.

But in fact, Dasein is always dying already. “It hides this fact by recoinning ‘death’ as just a ‘case of death’ in Others.”

There is more to the They-self’s interpretation of death. They impute upon it a **certainty**: Every one dies at some point of time. But this certainty is mixed with the evasiveness described above, leading to a kind of ambiguity. The nature of this certainty is thus: “Taken strictly, a certainty which is only empirical may be attributed to death.” This empirical certainty evades Being-certain; but this evasion reveals that death must be conceived as certain in the disclosive sense.

“The ‘they’ covers up what is peculiar in death’s [apodictic] certainty—that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the **indefiniteness** of its when. Everyday Being-towards-death evades this indefiniteness by conferring [empirical] definiteness upon it.”

“The existential conception of death has been established...we have also characterized inauthentic Being-towards-Death. It is with these positive and prohibitive instructions that the existential edifice of an authentic Being-towards-Death must let itself be projected.”

For this, what is left is to understand how Being-towards-death is a Being towards a possibility.

“Dasein comports itself towards something possible in its possibility by expecting it...[but] by the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual.” But death’s possibility is not the actualizable possibility of something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. It gives Dasein nothing to be actualized. We call this Being-towards-possibility *anticipation*, rather than *expectation*. The

possibility of death is farthest from anything actual; is the impossibility of existence; and this possibility is set free by its anticipation, which is Being-towards-death. "Anticipation is the possibility authentic existence." Thus, Being towards this possibility discloses Dasein's **ownmost** potentiality-for-Being, wrenched away from the they-self, to itself.

So, we end with five things characterizing death:

1. Ownmost
2. Non-relational
3. Not to be outstripped
4. Certain
5. Indefinite